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ILLINOIS GIVES GREEN LIGHT TO FALSE LIGHT:
BERKOS v. NBC, INC.
INTRODUCTION
On December 19, 1983, as part of its ongoing investigative reports, a
Chicago television newscast detailed new charges in connection with the
Operation Greylord investigations into judicial corruption in Cook County.
The newscast named Judge Christy Berkos as one of the judges presiding in
a particular courtroom the day that a pay-off was allegedly made to influence
a case in which Judge Berkos had found the plaintiff not guilty. Reporter
Peter Karl noted that Berkos had not been charged with any wrongdoing
and reported that Berkos, in a brief interview earlier that night, denied
knowing either the FBI agent who made the pay-offs or the Chicago police
officer who had solicited and accepted them.
Soon after, Judge Berkos sued NBC and newscaster Karl, alleging four
tort claims, including libel and false light invasion of privacy.' While the
lower court dismissed all four claims, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed
and remanded as to Berkos's libel and false light claims. It is the appellate
court's recognition of Berkos' false light claim, buried in the opinion, that
makes this case significant. Berkos is the first Illinois case to recognize a
cause of action for false light. The novelty of the holding is in the court's
reasoning-or, rather, lack of it-in recognizing false light. Further, a close
look at the common-law development of privacy in Illinois reveals that false
light's roots are tenuous, raising doubt as to the holding's legitimacy.
However, even if one thinks false light should be actionable in Illinois,
Berkos v. NBC, Inc.,2 is not an appropriate case in which to recognize it.
The Berkos case involved a matter of public interest, and false light claims
(and privacy claims in general) in Illinois generally fail when pitted against
the press' competing first amendment privilege to publish matters of public
interest.'
1. Berkos v. NBC, Inc., 161 I1. App. 3d 476, 515 N.E.2d 668 (1st Dist. 1987), appeal
denied, 119 I1. 2d 553, 522 N.E.2d 1241 (1988). Judge Berkos' four tort claims included: libel;
commercial appropriation of name and likeness (one of four recognized forms of tort of
invasion of privacy); publicity which unreasonably places another in a false light before the
public (another form of invasion of privacy); and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The lower court dismissed all four claims. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of Berkos' claims for commercial appropriation of name and likeness, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the court reversed and remanded as to
Berkos' libel and false light privacy claims.
2. 161 I11 App. 3d 476, 515 N.E.2d 668 (1st Dist. 1987).
3. See, e.g., Leopold v. Levin, 45 III. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970) (Illinois Supreme
Court dismissed plaintiff's three privacy claims because plaintiff was public figure whose affairs
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Because libel law is perceived by the courts and commentators to be similar
to privacy law, this Casenote will begin with a brief review of that doctrine.
Indeed, plaintiffs in Illinois often assert libel and false light claims together,
as did Judge Berkos.4 Moreover, the competition of interests in libel actions
(the plaintiff's desire to protect an unsullied reputation and the press' first
amendment freedom to publish what it chooses), parallels the tension in
false light between a plaintiff's right not to be portrayed falsely and the
press' first amendment right to publish matters of public interest.
Next, this Casenote will examine invasion of privacy and the four different
torts that comprise it: commercial appropriation of name and likeness; public
disclosure of private facts; intrusion upon seclusion; and, publicity which
unreasonably places another in a false light before the public. This Casenote
will emphasize the last of these four, the tort of false light. An understanding
of all four privacy torts is necessary because false light's emergence in Illinois
is enmeshed with the development of the other three invasion of privacy
torts.
This Casenote will focus on the Berkos court's recognition of false light,
questioning whether the opinion properly reflects the development of privacy,
and especially false light, in Illinois. Finally, this Casenote will briefly address
the Berkos decision's possible impact in Illinois.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Libel and False Light: First Amendment Standards
The first amendment stands for freedom of expression in both speech and
the press.5 Preceding the development of first amendment law was the
were matter of public record and legitimate public interest); Adreani v. Hansen, 80 I11. App.
3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (lst Dist. 1980) (privacy right is limited in areas of legitimate public
interest); Cassidy v. ABC, Inc., 60 Il. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126 (1st Dist. 1978) (privacy
claim dismissed because police officer's conduct on duty is matter of public concern); Buzinski
v. Do-All Co., 31 111. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577 (1st Dist. 1961) (privacy right is limited in
areas of legitimate public interest); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 I11. App. 2d 331,
168 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. 1960) (mother's privacy claim against magazine dismissed because,
inter alia, report on her son was matter of public interest).
4. Berkos, 161 I11. App. 3d 476, 515 N.E.2d 668. For other cases in which plaintiffs
asserted both libel and false light, see e.g., Cantrell v. ABC, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Adreani, 80 III. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679. See also RESm iimENT (SECOND) OP TORTS
§ 652E comment b (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)] (often false light invasion of
privacy claim will afford an alternative or additional libel remedy, and plaintiff can proceed
on either theory or both).
5. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
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common law tort of libel, or defamation by the printed word.6 The first
amendment and the common law of libel law conflict when the press, relying
on its first amendment right to publish freely, prints an account that libels
someone's good reputation in the community or among his peers. 7 The
tension between these competing concerns-the press' right to publish and
the individual's right to maintain his good reputation-eventually led to the
development of constitutional guarantees for the press articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in the 1964 case New York Times v. Sullivan.'
The New York Times case provided a shield for the press. It would no
longer publish at its peril. Plaintiffs who fell into the category of public
officials were required to prove fault as a prerequisite to establishing liability
on the part of the press. The Court ruled that the Constitution requires
elected public officials to prove libel under the "actual malice" standard.9
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 4, at § 559 (discussing what constitutes
defamatory communication). The Restatement (Second's) definition says that a communication
Is defamatory "if it tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." Id. In the
past, courts relying on the established common law of libel tried to make allowances for news
reporting that published erroneous information. Some courts, recognizing that giving unequiv-
ocal protection to citizens, especially public figures, failed to accommodate a free society's
Interest in a free flow of ideas and access to information, attempted to balance these competing
values. Generally, these courts held that a defendant published at his own risk unless he could
prove the libelous statement was true or privileged. See, e.g., Owens v. Scott Publishing Co.,
46 Wash. 2d 666, 284 P.2d 296 (1955) (defamatory words spoken of a person, which in
themselves prejudice him, are actionable per se, unless they are either true or privileged), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 968 (1956); Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (plaintiff's photo in
newspaper depicting her as a nurse who advocated malt whiskey for herself and her patients
constituted libel because It was defamatory and false). For a succinct history of the evolution
of common law libel and libel statutes, see R. LAaulSKs, LmEL AND THE FIRST ANENDmNT,
LEo A HISTORY AND PACnCE IN PRINT AND BROACASTro (1987). See infra note 32 (discussing
definitions of statutory and common law libel).
7. See, e.g., Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1st Dist.
1980) (Illinois libel case).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times had published an advertisement on March
29, 1960 on behalf of the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for
Freedom in the South. Id. at 257. The advertisement included some false statements about the
events that had occurred in Montgomery, Alabama during the civil rights movement. Id. at
258. L.B. Sullivan, a Montgomery city commissioner, sued the Times and others for libel
because, although the advertisement did not refer to Sullivan by name, he contended that the
defamatory reference to "police" in fact referred to him since he was the Montgomery
commissioner who supervised the police department. Id. The jury awarded Sullivan $500,000
In damages. Id. at 256. The Supreme Court reversed.
9. Id. at 283. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191; see generally Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy,
56 CA In .L. REv. 935, 935-43, 948-55 (1968). Nimmer suggests that the New York Times
decision indicates a third approach to interpreting protected speech under the first amendment
that avoids the absolutist approach that all speech is protected, and the ad hoc balancing
approach that a balance must be struck between the claims of free speech and other claims
such as public order or privacy. This third approach, which Nimmer calls "definitional"
1989] 1123
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To prove actual malice, elected public officials must prove that the press
published material critical of their official conduct either knowing that the
information was false or in reckless disregard for the truth. 0
Underlying the Court's opinion was the concern that money judgments
against newspapers and other media for honest or negligent mistakes in
publishing defamatory material about public officials would stymie the first
amendment's commitment to promoting debate on public issues that is
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."" Three years later, in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts," the Supreme Court extended the actual malice rule
beyond elected officials to include public figures. Because public officials
and public figures now had to prove actual malice on the part of the press,
the Curtis and New York Times decisions made it more difficult for them
to prove libel claims.
The Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard to include false
light claims in its 1967 decision Time, Inc. v. Hill.3 The Hill family's home
had been invaded in 1952 by three escaped convicts who held the family
prisoner for 19 hours.' 4 Soon after, a novel and a play fictionalized the
family's ordeal.' 5 In 1955, Life magazine published a story which portrayed
the play as an actual reenactment of the Hills' experience.' 6 Mr. Hill sued
Life, based on New York's commercial appropriation statute, claiming the
false statements of fact invaded his family's privacy. '7 The lower court found
that the Life story placed Hill and his family in a false light.'8
The Supreme Court, recognizing the similarity between false light and
libel, found the actual malice standard applied to libel in New York Times
to be an appropriate standard for false light as well. Because Life magazine
balancing, weighs the policy considerations that accompany a concern for first amendment
protection. For example, one important policy concern evident in the New York Times opinion
is that public dialogue on issues vital to the democratic process should not be limited by what
a jury decides is true.
10. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 278-83.
11. Id. at 270.
12. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). Butts defined public figures as those non-public persons who
"are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by
reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Id. at 164.
13. 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
14. Id. at 377-79.
15. Id. The Hill family was not identified in the novel or play so there was no privacy
action. See J. HAYES, THE DESPERATE HouRs (1955).
16. Id. at 377-79.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 378-80. The jury awarded Hill $50,000 in compensatory and $25,000 in punitive
damages. The appellate division of the Supreme Court ordered a new trial as to damages but
sustained the jury verdict of liability. Hill v. Hayes, 18 A.D.2d 485, 489, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286,
291 (App. Div. 1963). At the new trial on damages, a jury was waived and the court awarded
$30,000 in compensatory damages. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Hill v. Hayes,
15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), amended, 16 N.Y.2d 658, 209 N.E.2d
282, 261 N.Y.S.2d 289, rev'd sub nom. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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was not found to meet this standard of knowing or reckless falsity, Mr. Hill
lost his false light claim.' 9 The Court denied damages to the plaintiff because
the trial court's jury instruction failed to require that he establish that Life
magazine had acted with actual malice. 20 The Supreme Court found that
privacy rights under false light, like libel's reputation rights, were less
important than the press' first amendment rights. 2' More significantly, by
applying the actual malice standard to false light in Hill, the Supreme Court
extended New York Times and found that all false light plaintiffs-not just
public officials and public figures-would have to prove actual malice when-
ever the alleged falsity involved a matter of public interest.2
In an effort to keep its libel and false light doctrines consistent, the
Supreme Court applied the Hill actual malice standard to subsequent libel
actions. The Court ruled in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.2 that all libel
plaintiffs-private individuals as well as public officials and public figures-
must prove actual malice as long as the libel involved matters of public
interest.
Three years later, however, the Court overruled Rosenbloom, and shifted
its focus in libel cases from the public interest nature of the publication to
the status of the plaintiff. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,24 the Supreme
Court held that private individuals bringing libel suits need not prove actual
malice. (The Gertz Court left intact the New York Times actual malice
requirement in libel suits by public officials and public figures). Thus, Gertz
signaled a restriction of the press' first amendment protection; even if the
information reported is a matter of public interest, a private individual
alleging libel will have only to prove negligence. 25
Based on the Supreme Court's past efforts to keep its libel and false light
holdings consistent, some commentators have argued that the Gertz opinion,
although a libel case, casts doubt on Hill.26 These commentators argue that
19. Hill, 385 U.S. at 397.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 388-91.
22. Id. at 387-91. While the court provided no definition of matters of public interest, it
noted: "We have no doubt that the subject of the Life [magazine] article, the opening of a
new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest." Id. at 388.
23. 403 U.S. 29, 40-57 (1971).
24. 418 U.S. 323, 345-47 (1974).
25. Id. at 347-48. For a discussion of Gertz' impact on libel law in Illinois, see Stonecipher
& Trager, The Impact of Gertz on the Law of Libel in Illinois, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 73.
26. See Walden & Netzhammer, False Light Invasion of Privacy: Untangling the Web of
Uncertainty, 9 Comm./ETrr. L.J. 347, 359-71 (1987). This uncertainty also has been recognized
by the Restatement (Second):
The effect of the Gertz decision upon the holding in Time, Inc. v. Hill has thus
been left in a state of uncertainty. In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. [419
U.S. 425 (1974)], the court found that the defendant was shown to have acted in
reckless disregard as to the truth of falsity of the statement, and it consciously
abstained from indicating the present authority of Hill.
Pending further enlightenment from the Supreme Court, therefore, this Section
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because the Court no longer requires private individuals to prove actual
malice when asserting a libel action, neither should private individuals bring-
ing false light claims have to prove actual malice.27 Although the Supreme
Court has reiterated since Gertz that all false light plaintiffs, private or
public, must prove actual malice,8 Justice Powell observed that Gertz "called
into question" the validity of Hill's actual malice standard.29
Indeed, some jurisdictions already have applied the lesser Gertz negligence
standard to false light cases.30 These courts have focused on the plaintiff's
status instead of on the public-interest nature of the report. Two recent cases
have held that private individuals bringing false light actions need prove




Libel law is concerned with harm to reputation. This concept, however,
is more complex than it first appears. Libel is not concerned with portrayals
that offend the plaintiff or are unpleasant to him. In fact, the feelings of
the plaintiff are not relevant in a libel action. Rather, libel is concerned with
portrayals which disgrace the plaintiff, or "excite adverse, derogatory or
provides that liability for invasion of privacy for placing the plaintiff in a false
light may exist if the defendant acted with knowledge of the falsity of the statement
or in reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. The Caveat leaves open the question
of whether there may be liability based on a showing of negligence as to truth or
falsity.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoN), supra note 4, at § 652E comment d.
27. See supra note 26.
28. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975).
29. Id. at 498 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). In that footnote, Justice Powell wrote:
The Court's abandonment of the "matter of general or public interest" standard
as the determinative factor for deciding whether to apply the New York Times
malice standard to defamation litigation brought by private individuals, Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974); see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting), calls into question the
conceptual basis of Time, Inc. v. Hill. In neither Gertz nor our more recent decision
in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), however, have we
been called upon to determine whether a State may constitutionally apply a more
relaxed standard of liability under a false-light theory of invasion of privacy.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Nelson v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applied libel
standard to privacy claim because of the similarity of claims); Rinsley v. Brandt, 6 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1222 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983) (standards that govern
recovery in defamation/libel action also govern in a false light privacy action).
31. Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981); Phillips v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981).
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unpleasant feelings against him." 32 Libel is a subset of the larger category
of defamation, and provides a cause of action to one who has been defamed
by means of the printed word. Libel's twin, slander, gives a cause of action
where defamation has been inflicted by means of the spoken word.33 Libel
has been extended beyond the printed word to include pictures, 34 signs, 35
and motion pictures.36
32. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF nsm LAW OF ToRTs 739 (4th ed. 1971); see generally
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). In Beauharnais, an action was brought alleging
group libel. The Court upheld the conviction of Joseph Beauharnais for distributing anti-black
leaflets on Chicago streets in violation of Illinois law. Although group libel was undermined
by subsequent court decisions, the Beauharnais case contains a comprehensive treltment by the
United States Supreme Court of the development of state libel laws and common law libel
concepts. For instance, the Supreme Court found that actual statutory definitions of libel varied
little. Eleven jurisdictions, including Illinois, had generally accepted the following definition:
A libel is a malicious defamation, expressed either by printing, or by signs or
pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to
impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation or publish the natural defects
of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule,
or financial injury.
Id. at 255-56, n.5.
Another twelve jurisdictions had adopted the following definition, with minor variations:
A libel is a malicious defamation of a person, made public by any printing, writing,
sign, picture, representation or effigy, tending to provoke him to wrath or expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of
public confidence and social intercourse; or any malicious defamation, made public
as aforesaid, designed to blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead, and
tending to scandalize or provoke his surviving relatives or friends.
Id. at 256, n.5.
Still another twenty jurisdictions followed common law precedents that, variously, defined libel
"in accordance with the usual rubric, as consisting of utterances which arouse 'hatred, contempt,
scorn, obloquy or shame,' and the like." Id. at 257 n.5 (quoting Grant v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945)). The Court found that the remaining seven jurisdictions
had definitions that did not fail into common patterns.
Despite the relative uniformity of libel definitions, however, one commentator has noted
that the practices that attached to those laws or common law precedents varied not only from
state to state but also from case to case within a state. See R. LABuNsKI, supra note 6, at 54.
For this reason, Labunski argues that discussing the evolution of libel law would be exhaustive
and, in view of the Supreme Court's efforts to provide national standards in the last 20 years,
unproductive, since most states have altered their libel laws to accommodate the Court's modern
interpretation of libel. Id. See supra note 6 (discussing common law and statutory libel).
33. W. PRossER, supra note 32, at 751. Most jurisdictions treat defamatory radio and
television broadcasts as libel, even though words there arc spoken. Compare Hartmann v.
Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) (broadcast is libel, not slander, if broadcaster
reads from a script) with Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932) (defamation
by broadcast is libel, not slander), appeal dismissed, 290 U.S. 599 (1933). See generally,
Comment, Defamation in Radio and Television-Past and Present, 15 MERcER L. Ry. 450
(1964) (tracing history of radio and television defamation). Illinois treats all defamation by the
media as libel. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 126, para. 11, 12 (1988). Thus, a plaintiff in Illinois who
asserts a defamation claim against the media must prove the elements of libel whether he is
defamed by a newspaper story or a television broadcast. Id.
34. Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936).
35. Haylock v. Sparke, 118 Eng. Rep. 512 (1853).
36. Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 A.D. 376, 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915).
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To assert the tort of libel, the plaintiff must establish the following
elements: 1) the statements must be capable of a defamatory meaning, though
it is not necessary that anyone believes the defamatory remarks to be true;
2) the meaning must be conveyed to a third party; and, 3) the publication
or utterance must be construed as a whole, so that defamatory portions may
be Balanced by other explanatory portions."
2. Libel in Illinois
In Illinois, plaintiffs may plead either libel per se or libel per quod. A
publication is libelous per se if the false language is "so obviously and
naturally h,/rtful to the person aggrieved that proof of [its] injurious character
can be, and is, dispensed with." 38 This determination is a matter of law.39
A publication is libelous per quod where a false statement, though not
libelous on its face, is rendered defamatory by extrinsic facts, and causes
special damages, specifically pecuniary loss. 40
Moreover, in Illinois the language will be deemed libelous unless it is easily
capable of a "reasonable innocent construction. ' 4 ' This effectively results
in a finding that the language is not libelous per se. That is, considering the
allegedly libelous statements in context, the court may determine that the
language can be construed as "innocent" of defamatory content. 42 If so, the
complaint must be dismissed as a matter of law. 43
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, at § 558. See W. PROSSER, supra note 32, at 751.
38. Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91 111. App. 3d 735, 741, 415 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Ist Dist.
1980). The Newell court also noted that Illinois courts have discerned four categories of words
that constitute libel per se: I) those imputing the commission of a criminal offense; 2) those
imputing infection with a communicable disease which, if true, would tend to exclude one from
society; 3) those imputing inability to perform or want of integrity in he discharge of duties
pf office or employment; and, 4) those prejudicing a particular party in his profession or trade.
Id.
39. Von Solbrig Memorial Hosp. v. Licata, 15 Ill. App. 3d, 1025, 1031, 305 N.E.2d 252,
256 (1st Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 313 N.E.2d 189 (1974) (whether writing
is libelous per se is question of law).
40. Audition Div., Ltd. v. Better Business Bureau, 120 Ill. App. 3d 254, 258, 458 N.E.2d
115, 119 (1st Dist. 1983).
41. Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Il1. 2d 344, 352, 442 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1982) (statement is
to be considered in context with words and implications given natural meaning and if statement
may reasonably be innocently interpreted it cannot be actionable per se).
42. Id. at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199.
43. Id. Among the defenses to libel are truth, privilege, and fair comment. D. Donas, TORTS
AND COMPENSATON 831-33 (1985). As in most jurisdictions, these three defenses are available
to the media in Illinois. The truth defense applies in Illinois so long as the news report is
"substantially true." See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 111. 2d 286, 293, 253 N.E.2d
408, 412 (1969); Sivulich v. Howard Publications, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 129, 466 N.E.2d 1218
(1st Dist. 1984) (report that plaintiff had been charged with aggravated battery held substantially
true where plaintiff had only been sued in civil action for battery). The privilege defense applies
generally to reports on the proceedings of government. Catalano v. Pechous, 83 I1. 2d 146,
419 N.E.2d 350 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). See also Lulay v. Peoria Journal-
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C. Invasion of Privacy
1. Generally
Invasion of privacy by the media or other citizens, while related to libel,
constitutes an entirely independent body of tort law. Put most simply, this
cause of action is founded upon "the right to be let alone."44 This is the
definition the Illinois Supreme Court embraced in its 1970 case Leopold v.
Levin '4 where it recognized for the first time the right to privacy not only
as a "sensitive and necessary human [value]," but also as a legally protected
right.
The notion of personal privacy grew out of the dramatically changing
social conditions of the late nineteenth century, which saw the rise of great
urban centers and a competitive mass press that often stretched traditional
bounds of news-gathering to entice readers.4 In their seminal 1890 Harvard
Law Review article, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, called for
recognition of a tort that would protect people from invasions of their
privacy by the press' overzealous reporting.47
Star, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 112, 214 N.E.2d 746 (1966) (report privilege is necessary to ensure freedom
of press to report government actions and utterances without being compelled to prove gov-
ernment declarations are in fact true and correct). Fair comment as a defense applies to the
honest expression of opinion or criticism on a matter of public interest based on facts. Compare
Byars v. Kolodziej, 48 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1018, 363 N.E.2d 628, 630 (4th Dist. 1977) (to hold
university department chairman's remarks about professor's qualifications for tenure as defam-
atory would chill right of every person to form and express opinion on matters of public
interest) with Kulesza v. Chicago Daily News, 311 Ill. App. 117, 35 N.E.2d 517, 520 (1st Dist.
1941) (matter of public interest and concern is legitimate subject of criticism by newspaper so
long as done fairly and with an honest purpose, however severe its terms may be).
44. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON TIE LAW OF TORTS 389 (1930).
Today, privacy is considered an intangible yet strongly felt personal right, protecting against
unpleasant and offensive intrusions that libel is not concerned with, as well as intrusions that
are embarrassing, humiliating, overreaching, or simply annoying. W. PROSSER, supra note 32,
at § 118.
Prosser notes that in addition to the common law of privacy, which affords a tort action
for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy, there also exists the constitutional
right to privacy, which protects personal privacy against unlawful governmental invasion. This
constitutional right to privacy was first acknowledged in Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250 (1891). In Botsford, the Court recognized a common law right "to be let alone,"
although no such specific constitutional right had been alleged. Id. at 251.
The leading case recognizing a constitutional right of privacy from governmental intrusion
is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding law forbidding use of contraceptives
infringes privacy rights of married persons). Eight years later, that right was fortified in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a discussion of common law and constitutional aspects of
the right to privacy, see Hanson, Illinois and the Right of Privacy: History and Current Status,
11 J. MARSHALL J. Pa.AC. & PROC. 91 (1977).
45. 45 II1. 2d 434, 440-41, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1970).
46. D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 188 (3d ed. 1981).
47. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 H.Av. L. REV. 193 (1890). Cf. D. PEMBER,
PRIVACY AND Tm Pa.ss: THm LAW, Tm MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 244 (1972)
(arguing that privacy law has grown in channels foreign to Warren and Brandeis's original
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In contrast to the injury to reputation which results from defamation,'" a
violation of the right of privacy involves an injury to one's feelings.49 While
this focus suggests a subjective inquiry is appropriate, the cause of action
has not developed in this way. Since the Warren and Brandeis article, the
right of privacy has developed into four separate torts: 1) commercial
appropriation of name and likeness; 2) public disclosure of private facts; 3)
unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion; and, 4) false light.50
2. Types of Privacy Invasion Torts
a. Commercial appropriation of name and likeness
New York was the first state to address the privacy doctrine when it
enacted a privacy statute in 1903.' However, that statute focused on a
concept of privacy different from that which Warren and Brandeis had
proposed. New York's law made it both a misdemeanor crime and a tort to
make use of the name, portrait, or picture of any person for "advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade" without the person's written consent. 2
This tort came to be known as "commercial appropriation of name and
likeness" and since has become widely recognized. 3 Unauthorized use of the
conceptual framework as best illustrated by development of tort of nondefamatory falsehood,
i.e., tort of "false light," one of four recognized torts of invasion of privacy); Kalven, Privacy
in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoEs. 326 (1966)
(arguing that public disclosure of private facts tort first suggested by Warren and Brandeis
virtually eliminated by first amendment privileges for press). See infra note 53 (discussing
various commentators' views of development of privacy and four torts it has spawned).
48. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
49. J. THOMAS McCARTHiY, THE Ricr-s oF PuBucrrY & PRivAcY §§ 5.8-.10 (1988) (privacy
claims involve some sort of mental distress or injury to self-esteem or dignity); see infra note
86.
50. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 4, at § 652A.
51. N.Y. Crv. RiaoHrs LAW §§ 50-51 (Consol. 1976).
52. Id.
53. See Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw.
U.L. REv. 553 (1961) (cases dealing with appropriation of some element of plaintiffs' personality
for commercial use would have avoided confusion and conflict and provided a firmer basis for
measuring damages had the allegations and decisions avoided the additional elements of privacy
and injured feelings). Through the years, New York courts construed the statute more broadly
to encompass other types of privacy rights, and other jurisdictions followed suit. W. PRossaR
& W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON rmu LAw OF ToaRS 850-51 (5th ed. 1984). In addition
to commercial appropriation of name and likeness, courts differentiated three other invasion
of privacy torts: a public disclosure of private facts; an unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another; and, publicity which unreasonably places another in a false light before
the public. RESTATEMENT (SscowN), supra note 4, at § 652A. Cf. Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 991 (1964)
(arguing that four privacy torts should be merged since all forms of privacy and defamation
involve essentially the same personal interest, i.e., protection of "individual personality and
dignity").
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plaintiff's name or likeness as a symbol of his identity gives rise to an action
for tortious commercial appropriation.5 4 To help explain the nature of
commercial appropriation, one author has likened an individual's persona
to a property right. 53
Commercial appropriation, however, is not just concerned with advertising
that appropriates one's name or likeness. A plaintiff also may recover when
defendant's gain has not been pecuniary, as when an individual impersonates
another in order to gain secret information.5 6 The focus is on whether the
appropriation directly benefits the defendant in some way. For example,
while a defendant is liable when plaintiff's name or likeness has been used
without his consent to promote business,"1 no liability attaches when a
plaintiff's character, occupation, or the outline of his career are used as the
basis for a fictitious character in a novel. 8
b. Public disclosure of private facts
Public disclosure of private facts most closely resembles the privacy tort
advocated by Warren and Brandeis. To state a cause of action for public
disclosure of private facts, the plaintiff must establish that the matter
publicized would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and would not
be of legitimate concern to the public. 9 Plaintiffs generally have been
54. Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962); Eick v. Perk Dog Food
Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
55. See D. PEMaER, supra note 46, at 199. The commercial appropriation doctrine experi-
enced renewed vigor in the early 1970's that continues today in the related area known as "the
right of publicity." Id. The term originally was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 816 (1953), to describe the right of people to control the exploitation of their name or
likeness for commercial gain. Not only have celebrities such as actors, writers, and athletes
continued to fight for the significant property rights to their names, but they are mounting
attacks on merchandisers and advertisers who fail to seek their consent based on material
already in the public domain. See Hoffman, The Right of Publicity Heirs' Rights, Advertisers'
Windfall or Courts' Nightmare?. 31 DEPAuL. L. REv. 1 (1981); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (right to publicity was violated when television
station broadcast entertainer's entire fifteen second performance which consisted of him being
shot out of canon into a net at local county fair).
56. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936)
(employee of Goodyear represented himself to tire dealers as the plaintiff in order to procure
confidential price information).
57. Selsman v. Universal Photo Books, Inc., 18 A.D.2d 151, 238 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1963).
58. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974); Toscani
v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946).
59. See, e.g., Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966) (Connecticut prisoner,
photographed during parole hearing that was televised, did not suffer invasion of privacy since
he was nameless and faceless and identifiable only by voice); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Moten,
27 Ariz. App. 759, 558 P.2d 954 (1976) (creditor does not incur liability for invasion of privacy
by contacting person's employer to collect, provided creditor does not engage in defamatory
or coercive conduct), petition for review denied (1977); Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga.
257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930) (photo of baby born with two heads published against permission of
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unsuccessful pleading public disclosure of private facts because courts are
reluctant to restrict the press' first amendment freedom to publish what it
deems important, especially if the information is true. 60 This so-called "news-
worthiness" privilege of the press to enlighten the public as to the truth, no
matter how private, extends to include public figures as well as matters of
public interest, and has been broadly interpreted by courts to cover everything
from information to entertainment. 6'
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that there might be limits
on the press' long-standing privilege to disclose private facts. In a footnote
to its decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 62 the Court wrote that public disclosure
of private facts may be tortious in extreme circumstances. The Hill footnote
focused on a leading public disclosure case, Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.61
In Sidis, the mundane facts about the adult life of a once-famous child
prodigy had been reported in New Yorker magazine." Although the plaintiff
failed on his public disclosure of private facts claim,65 the Sidis court noted
mother deemed not of legitimate concern to public and, thus, invasion of privacy). See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 4, at § 652D. The "not of legitimate concern to the public"
provision is generally referred to as the "newsworthiness defense." Walden & Netzhammer,
supra note 26, at 354.
60. See Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding no right to
privacy where magazine published account of murder that was subject of public trial), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3rd Cir. 1958)
(holding no right to privacy where account of murder three months previous still had news
interest), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958). But see Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4
Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (although story concerning truck hijacking
was newsworthy, use of plaintiff's name I I years after the event was not necessarily privileged);
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (use of plaintiff's true identity without
her consent in a motion picture that was based on her past life of infamy not privileged).
For a comprehensive list of cases which precluded plaintiffs' recovery based on a newswor-
thiness privilege, see Ashdown, Media Reporting and Privacy Claims' Decline in Constitutional
Protection for the Press, 66 Ky. L.J. 759, 763 (1977-78).
61. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.) (mundane life of child
prodigy), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95
S.E.2d 606 (1956) (unwanted publicity surrounding birth of a child to a 12 year old married
mother); see also Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (news includes
items and events that embody "that indefinable quality of information which attracts public
attention") (quoting Associated Press v. International News Service. 245 F. 244, 248 (2d Cir.
1917), aff'd, 248 U.S 215 (1918)).
62. 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967). The Court wrote: "This limitation to newsworthy persons
and events does not of course foreclose an interpretation of the statute to allow damages where
'[r]evelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to
outrage the community's notions of decency."' Id. (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113
F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
63. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
64. Id. at 807. Sidis lectured to distinguished mathematicians on the subject of Four-
Dimensional Bodies, and graduated from Harvard College when he was 16. At the time of the
article, he was living in a "hall bedroom of Boston's shabby south end," was an "insignificant
clerk" collecting streetcar transfers, and had a "curious laugh." Id.
65. Id. at 811.
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in dicta that some "revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted...
as to outrage the community's notions of decency."66 Seven years later, in
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,67 the Supreme Court reinforced the suggestion
that the long-dormant privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts might
acquire new life.
The Cox case arose when a Georgia television station broadcast the name
of a deceased rape victim it had obtained from court records.68 The father
of the deceased victim brought suit against the station, claiming that the
disclosure of his daughter's name was an invasion of his right to privacy.69
Although the Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments allow for
public disclosure of truthful information contained in public records,70 the
decision was a narrow one which did not extend constitutional protection to
public disclosure of all facts, but only to those which were-a part of public
records.7 Thus, some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court
intended Cox to sustain the possibilities suggested by the Hill footnote-
that public disclosure of facts not contained in public documents could be
tortious.7 2 However, other commentators have questioned the constitution-
ality of punishing the press for publishing the ttuth, however private, and
have suggested that courts-including the Supreme Court-would continue
to reject any cause of action for publication of the truth.7
c. Unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion
Unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion is the tort which protects individuals
against eavesdropping through use of a wiretap or mictophone.7 4 However,
66. Id. at 809.
67. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment,
76 COLUM. L. Ray. 1205, 1268 (1976) (argued that Supreme Court's Cox opinion showed
Court's growing receptivity to finding liability for media disclosure of matters not of public
record). See supra note 62 (quoting Supreme Court's footnote in Hill, 385 U.S. at 383 n.7,
which first implied such receptivity).
68. 420 U.S. at 472.
69. Id. at 474.
70. Id. at 495.
71. Id. at 494-95; Ashdown, supra note 60, at 769-72.
72. Ashdown, supra note 60, at 769-72. Echoing the Hill article's remarks of a year earlier
that the Supreme Court's Cox opinion revealed its receptivity to possible future liability for
public disclosure of private facts, Ashdown argued that the Cox Court's cautious approach,
evident in its narrow holding, had suggested that the privacy interest would fare better than it
had in the past. See supra note 62 (for Hill Court's footnote first suggesting such receptivity).
73. See, e.g., D. PEMBER, supra note 46, at 214 (judiciary places great weight on role of
press to inform and enlighten public); Zimmerman, keqtiiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell
to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 COR 1EL L. REY. 291, 304-06 (1993) ("history of
first amendment neither supports nor justifies a.system of tort liability for true speech," and
policy justification for public disclosure of private facts tort is "not sufficiently compelling to
justify infringement of fundamental first amendment rights").
74. See, e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d
647 (1970) (charge that defendants engaged in unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping by
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this tort also protects against an intentional interference with plaintiff's
physical solitude, such as an intrusion into his home,-' his shopping bag, 76
or his bank account without authorization. In recognizing this cause of
action for the first time in Illinois, the appellate court in Melvin v. Burling
relied on Prosser's Handbook of the Law of Torts. The four factors of this
tort as listed in Prosser's Handbook are: I) an unauthorized intrusion or
prying into the plaintiff's seclusion; 2) the intrusion must be offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable man; 3) the matter intruded into must be
private; and, 4) the intrusion must cause the plaintiff anguish and suffering. 1
d. False light
The false light doctrine protects an individual against intrusions which are
characterized by widely disseminated false information about that individual,
which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 79 Professors Prosser
and Keeton traced false light to 1816, when Lord Byron sued to enjoin the
circulation of a bad poem that was attributed to him.10 Today, false light
generally falls into one of two categories: fictionalization and false state-
ments.8 '
Fictionalization occurs most often in dramatizations, feature articles, and
books in which writers imbue true stories with sensational details." False
statements claims are more common than fictionalization claims. 3 False
statements result, for instance, from the exclusion of key facts which results
mechanical means meets requirements to spell out cause of action for invasion of privacy).
The significant difference between this form of invasion of privacy and the other three is
that intrusion upon seclusion occurs unlawfully as soon as the intrusion takes place, even if
the information gleaned is not revealed or published. See D. Pember, supra note 46, at 204.
75. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), affd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1971).
76. Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959).
77. Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (1936), aff'd on rehearing, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir.
1939).
78. 141 Ill. App. 3d 786, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1986). See also Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 47; see, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 73 (case can be made in society for positive
value of gossip, and only narrow right to recover for public disclosure of personal facts should
be preserved).
79. See, e.g., Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978) (no privacy
action if substantially true); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (1977)
(publicity is required to sustain privacy action); Strickler v. NBC, 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal.
1958) (question of fact whether television broadcast's fictitious details of plaintiff's conduct
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person).
80. W. PROSSER & W. KEaToN, supra note 53, at 863.
81. D. PEMBER, supra note 46, at 230.
82. See, e.g., Strickler, 167 F. Supp. at 68 (NBC failed to show naval officer's heroism but
instead portrayed him out of uniform and smoking, contrary to actual facts of the real life
emergency landing of commercial airliner).
83. D. PEMBEa, supra note 46, at 230.
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in rendering the story untrue and more sensational.8 4 Similarly, this cause
of action can arise from editorial decisions to rearrange the facts, or to write
a photo caption in such a way as to sensationalize the story, or to print a
photo and invite incorrect conclusions.85
This type of false light injury appears similar to libel, as both involve
allegedly false information and cause harm to a personal interest. Indeed,
Dean Prosser at one time declared that the false light tort protected the same
interest as libel, that of reputation. 6 Today, however, false light and libel
are seen as distinct torts.Y The significant difference between libel and false
light is that in libel a damaged reputation is the harm, while in false light
the harm is the highly offensive abuse of the plaintiff's right to be let alone. 8
84. See, e.g., Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969) (after wife killed herself and children, husband sued publication
for portraying wife in false light, i.e., that she had been happy and normal, when in fact she
had a history of being despondent and depressed).
85. See, e.g., Cibenko v. Worth Publishers Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1981) (photograph
of police officer prodding sleeping black man with nightstick used to illustrate college sociology
textbook and to imply racist attitude improperly, held not to be libelous).
86. W. PROSSER & W. KaEroN, supra note 53, at 865-66. Prosser contended in the 1960's
that the false light tort protected the same personal interest as defamation, that of reputation.
Prosser suggested that the false light category might even be capable of "swallowing up and
engulfing the whole law of public defamation." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAdtu. L. Rav. 383, 400-
01 (1960); see also Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093 (1962)
(suggested strong enough relationship among defamation, false light and public disclosure of
private facts to justify merger of all three into single tort of intentional infliction of mental
suffering).
Prosser and Keeton's current treatise focuses on the offensiveness that inevitably flows from
false light actions. W. PROSSER & W. KEroN, supra note 53, at 865. However, two commen-
tators have criticized this view because they believe that Prosser and Keeton's assumption that
a false invasion is offensive, ignores the heart of the wrong-whether the communication is
privacy-invading in the first place. They explain:
Keeton's false light definition is akin to a libel definition stressing the falsity and
fault elements but ignoring the need for defamatory content. Keeton seems to be
suggesting a tort designed to compensate people for the irritation they may expe-
rience as the result of being identified in a non-defamatory, non-privacy-invading,
but untrue, communication. Such a tort might go far in stemming what used to be
termed the licentiousness of the press, but it hardly comports with our twentieth
century conception of what constitutes freedom of expression. . . . Keeton's con-
ceptualization of false light places much emphasis on the offensiveness of fiction-
alized accounts. . . . But . . . offensiveness alone has not been deemed sufficient
to overcome first amendment rights.
Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 26, at 376-77.
87. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 53, at 866.
88. Several leading Supreme Court cases delineate the difference. While the Court in New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was most concerned with prescribing the consti-
tutional dimensions of the privilege to defame, the underlying issue nonetheless was the possibly
libelous nature of the remarks published in the New York Times advertisement, and whether
they harmed the reputation of L.B. Sullivan. In contrast, the Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967), considered whether false statements of fact resulted in liability where plaintiffs'
interest in and right to be let alone was damaged, not their reputations. Similarly, the Court
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Although plaintiffs bringing libel and false light claims cannot seek double
recovery,8 9 they typically plead both causes of action.9" False light claims
which are not also libelous are those in which the false portrayal of the
plaintiff, while an unreasonable invasion of his privacy, nevertheless does
not harm the plaintiff's reputation. 9'
3. Invasion of Privacy in Illinois
Until the mid-1970's, Illinois courts treated invasion of privacy claims
cautiously. An Illinois appellate court first recognized a privacy right in a
1952 suit for commercial appropriation of name and likeness. In Eick v.
Perk Dog Food Co.,9 a blind girl's photograph was used without her
permission to promote the sale of dog food. The court held that she properly
pleaded a violation of her right to privacy based on commercial appropriation
of her photograph.93 However the Eick court stressed that privacy rights in
Illinois were limited in favor of the press' right to publish the information
if it involved a newsworthy event .
4
in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), considered and granted recovery
on a false light theory. In Cantrell, a newspaper account describing a bridge disaster victim's
destitute family was published eight months after the event. Id. at 247. The Court found the
report invaded plaintiffs' privacy by portraying certain aspects of their situation falsely, and
subjecting them to pity and ridicule, even though their reputations were not harmed in the legal
sense, i.e., they were not libeled. Id. at 246-48.
89. Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wash. 2d 253, 396 P.2d 793 (1964) (plaintiff may allege defamation
and invasion of privacy in separate claims or alternatively, but may not recover twice for same
elements of damage growing out of same occurrence of event). See generally RESTAThmENT
(SEcoND), supra note 4, at § 652E.
90. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 245; Berkos v. NBC, Inc., 161 Il1. App. 3d 476, 515 N.E.2d 668
(1st Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 119 11. 2d 553, 522 N.E.2d 1241 (1988); Adreani v. Hansen,
80 Ill. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1st Dist. 1980).
91. See e.g., Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952). In Gill,
plaintiffs sued for invasion of privacy after a photograph of them in a romantic pose at their
place of business was published in Ladies Home Journal, with a caption cautioning that love
at first sight is a bad risk. Id. at 275, 239 P.2d at 632. Plaintiffs had not consented to the
taking of the photo or its publication. While the photo was not uncomplimentary, the court
held that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Id. at 281-82, 239 P.2d
at 635-36. The court said that the caption and accompanying article portrayed plaintiffs as
people who had only a sexual interest in each other, which invaded their privacy by impinging
on their sensibilities. Id. at 279, 239 P.2d at 634.
See also Zolich, Laudatory Invasion of Privacy, 16 CLEv.-MARSHALL L. REv. 532, 535-36
(1967). While Zolich finds that laudatory invasion of privacy fits within the privacy tort of
public disclosure of private facts, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that laudatory invasion of
privacy also exists in situations where plaintiffs allege false light based on material that may
be complimentary or neutral, but false nonetheless, and, therefore, possibly tortious. Douglass
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986).
See supra note 88 (further explaining basic difference between libel and false light invasion of
privacy). See infra notes 104-06, 198-210 and accompanying text (further discussing false light
recovery).
92. 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952) (abstract).
93. Id. at 306, 106 N.E.2d at 748.
94. Id.
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The idea that an invasion of privacy will be justified by the press' proper
exercise of its first amendment freedom has prevailed in Illinois. As long as
the published material was a matter of legitimate public interest, plaintiffs
have failed in their privacy claims.95 Based on this deference to the press,
one Illinois decision explicitly admonished Illinois courts to "proceed with
caution" when considering whether to expand the right to privacy beyond
commercial appropriation." Indeed, when the Illinois Supreme Court for-
mally recognized a right to privacy in Leopold v. Levin, it quoted the same
caveat .97
In Leopold, Nathan Leopold brought suit to prevent further publication
of the novel and film "Compulsion," which was based on the events
surrounding Leopold's conviction for the murder of Bobby Franks.98 Leopold
brought three claims, the first for commercial appropriation and the second
for false light. He fashioned his false light claim to read like the false light
claim brought by the plaintiff in Time, Inc. v. Hill.99 In his final claim,
Leopold alleged that publicizing the information was so outrageous as to
offend public decency.100 The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted this claim
to be one for public disclosure of private facts, because Leopold had based
it on the language from the Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. court's dicta.' 0'
95. See, e.g., Buzinski v. Do-All Co., 31 I11. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 577 (lst Dist. 1961)(privacy right is limited in areas of legitimate public interest); Bradley v. Cowles Magazines,
Inc., 26 11. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. 1960) (mother's privacy claim against
magazine dismissed, inter alia, because report on her son was matter of public interest).
96. Bradley, 26 I1. App. 2d at 334, 168 N.E.2d at 65.
97. 45 Ill. 2d 434, 440, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1970). Three years before the Leopold decision,
the Illinois legislature, recognizing that a right of privacy existed at common law at least for
commercial appropriation of name and likeness, passed a statute of limitations for invasion of
privacy actions. ILL. RV. STAT. ch. 83, para. 14 (1967). That statute, as amended, reads:
"Actions for slander, libel or for publication of matter violating the right of privacy, shall be
commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued." ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 13-201 (1983).
98. Leopold, 45 II. 2d at 437-39, 259 N.E.2d at 252-53.
99. Id. at 444-46, 259 N.E.2d at 255-57.
100. The Court in Leopoldwrote: "A carefully narrowed argument of the plaintiff appears
to be that the defendants through 'knowingly fictionalized accounts' caused the public to
identify the plaintiff with inventions or fictionalized episodes in the book and motion picture
which were so offensive and unwarranted as to 'outrage the community's notions of decency.'
45 I1. 2d at 443-44, 259 N.E.2d at 255-56 (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
101. The Court wrote:
We express no comment on whether or not the news worthiness of the matter
printed will always constitute a complete defense. Revelations may be so intimate
and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notions of decency. But when focused upon public characters, truthful comments
upon dress, speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality will usually not
transgress this line.
113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
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The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. 02
Although the Leopold court formally recognized invasion of privacy in
Illinois, it refused to find that Leopold had suffered such a tort and dismissed
the action. 03 In its discussion of privacy rights, the Leopold court did not
explicitly rule out the existence of false light or public disclosure of private
facts in Illinois, nor did it recognize them. 04 Furthermore, the court failed
to recognize Leopold's commercial appropriation claim. 05 Instead, as noted,
the court cited with approval Illinois appellate courts that had approached
102. Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill.2d 434, 436, 446, 259 N.E.2d 250, 252, 257 (1970).
103. Id. at 440-42, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
104. Leopold fashioned his invasion of privacy claim to read, in part, as one for false light,
patterning his allegations after those made by the plaintiff in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S 374
(1967). Leopold, 45 111. 2d at 444-45, 259 N.E.2d at 256. The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
distinguished Leopold's "knowingly fictionalized" (i.e., false light) claim from the Hill plain.
tiff's claim, and explicitly rejected Hill as supporting Leopold's position in any way. Id. The
Illinois Supreme Court noted that while Life magazine's article in Hill was found to give the
false impression that the play reflected what really happened to the Hill family, the "Compul-
sion" materials in Leopold were represented to be fictional from the outset. Id. The Leopold
court looked to Hill to note further that the "right of privacy when involved with the publication
of a matter of public interest was viewed narrowly and cautiously by the United States Supreme
Court. Id. at 442, 259 N.E.2d at 255. The Leopold court also stated:
It is clear that [Hill] involved a situation essentially dissimilar from the one here.
The case involved what was claimed to be a false but purportedly factual account
of the Hill incident. Here, the motion picture, play and novel, while "suggested"
by the crime of the plaintiff, were evidently fictional and dramatized materials and
they were not represented to be otherwise.
Id. at 445, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the "Compulsion" novel and film could not be
subject to the actual malice standards discussed in Hill.
As for Leopold's public disclosure of private facts claim, the court found:
Even if one were to accept the validity of the dictum [of the Sidis court] for the
purpose of discussing It, the genesis of the fictionalized episodes in "Compulsion,"
as we have observed, can be traced in a substantial way to the exposed conduct of
Leopold. Argument that the community's notions of decency were outraged here
must be regarded as fanciful.
Id. at 444, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
105. The Illinois Supreme Court said of Leopold's commercial appropriation claim:
The contention that a right of privacy was violated by an appropriation, without
consent, of the plaintiff's name and likeness for the commercial gain of the
defendants through their advertisements must also fail. The circumstances here
obviously are distinguishable from those In cases, such as Eick v. Perk Dog Food
Co. [347 I1. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1950)], which the plaintiff cites. There, as
has been noted, a likeness, i.e., a photograph of a girl who was clearly not a public
figure, was "appropriated" to promote a purely commercial product. Unlike here,
no question of freedom of expression was presented. The reference to the plaintiff
in the advertising material concerned the notorious crime to which he had pleaded
guilty. His participation was a matter of public and, even, of historical record.
That conduct was without benefit of privacy.
Leopold, 45 Ill. 2d at 444, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
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with caution any expansion of privacy rights beyond commercial appropri-
ation of name and likeness. 106
The Leopold court thus reinforced the theme originally voiced in Eick and
subsequently reiterated by most appellate opinions up to that time; that
privacy rights in Illinois were limited to commercial appropriation of name
and likeness, and that this was so because the press' first amendment
protection in reporting on matters of public interest properly limited indi-
viduals' privacy rights." 7 In support of allowing the press broad discretion,
the Illinois Supreme Court cited explicit language from Time, Inc. v. Hill
and New York Times v. Sullivan. Quoting the United States Supreme Court
in New York Times, the Illinois Supreme Court stressed that the wide berth
the Illinois courts had given to the media in all its forms-books, newspapers,
magazines, and motion pictures-was consistent with the Supreme Court's
announced objective of insuring "uninhibited, robust and wide-open discus-
sion of legitimate public issues."'' 0
Despite the Illinois Supreme Court's strong language in Leopold, caution-
ing against expanding privacy actions beyond commercial appropriation, an
Illinois appellate court nonetheless recognized public disclosure of private
facts five years later in Midwest Glass v. Stanford.109 Although Midwest
106. The court in Leopold found that the "dimensions of the [privacy] right in Illinois have
thus far been conservatively interpreted under the appellate courts' decisions," beginning with
Elck, 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 142, which had observed that "the right of privacy is a
limited one in areas of legitimate public interest as where there is a legitimate news interest in
one's photograph or likeness as a public figure." Leopold, 45 IlI. App. at 440, 259 N.E.2d at
254. The Leopold court also observed that the opinions in Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc.,
26 Il. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960), in which plaintiff was found to have no cognizable
privacy claim because the published information concerned a matter of public interest, and
subsequent cases had not "admitted a broader right than was announced in Eick." Leopold,
45 Ill. 2d at 440, 259 N.E.2d at 254. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded:
We agree that there should be recognition of a right of privacy, a right many years
ago described in a limited fashion by Judge Cooley with utter simplicity as the right
"to be let alone." Privacy Is one of the sensitive and necessary human values and
undeniably there are circumstances under which it should enjoy the protection of
law. However, we must hold here that the plaintiff did not have a legally protected
right of privacy. Considerations which in our judgment require this conclusion
include: the liberty of expression constitutionally assured in a matter of public
interest, as the one here; the enduring public attention to the plaintiff's crime and
prosecution, which remain an American cause celebre and the plaintiff's consequent
and continuing status as a public figure.
Leopold, 45 I!1. 2d at 440-41, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
107. See supra note 95 (Illinois cases which support this proposition).
108. Leopold, 45 Ill. 2d at 442, 259 N.E. 2d at 255.
109. 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274 (1st Dist. 1975). Midwest Glass sued the Stanford
Development Company under oral contract for payment for mirrors Midwest Glass had installed
in a condominium building that Stanford built. Stanford countersued, seeking damages for
Invasion of privacy for the public disclosure of private debt. Stanford claimed that Midwest
Glass Informed purchasers of the condominium units orally and in writing that payment was
overdue on the mirrors, and a lien would be filed against the respective units. The trial court
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Glass explicitly recognized public disclosure as a tort, it eventually became
more significant for its discussion of false light. Regarding the plaintiff's
invasion of privacy claim, the court noted that both the Illinois legislature
and Illinois Supreme Court recognized such a right." 0 In dicta, the Midwest
Glass court discussed all four privacy torts, including false light, and referred
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Prosser's Handbook of the Law
of Torts as testimonials to their legitimacy."' However, because the court
noted that it was concerned specifically with Prosser's third category of
invasion of privacy, public disclosure of private facts," 2 it is apparent that
the court intended to recognize this tort alone." 3 Nonetheless, it was the
court's passing notice of false light which several later courts found to be
the most significant aspect of the case." 4
Some Illinois courts spurned the Midwest Glass dicta and instead empha-
sized the strong language of the Illinois Supreme Court in Leopold to deny
dismissed Stanford's counterclaim, and Stanford appealed. Id. at 131-33, 339 N.E.2d 275-76.
Noting that the case was one of first impression in Illinois, the Midwest Glass court looked
to other jurisdictions to determine whether Stanford, in its counterclaim, had properly pleaded
public disclosure of private facts. Id. at 133-35, 339 N.E.2d at 276-78. While the court held
that Stanford had failed to maintain a cause of action for public disclosure of private debt, it
nonetheless explicitly recognized the tort as a cause of action in Illinois. Id.
110. Id. at 133, 339 N.E.2d at 277. See infra note 115 (quoting ILL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 12).
111. 34 Ill. App. 3d at 13, 339 N.E.2d at 277. The Midwest court said:
In analyzing the common law right to privacy, Professor William L. Prosser has
delineated four distinct kinds of torts which constitute an invasion of privacy. This
breakdown, which has been adopted by the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 652A
. .. as well as many other foreign jurisdictions .. . comprise the following
situations: (1) an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, (2) the
appropriation of another's name or likeness, (3) a public disclosure of private facts
or (4) publicity which unreasonably places another in a false light before the public.
Id. (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 32, at § 117).
112. Immediately after citing the Restatement (Second's) and Prosser's four kinds of invasion
of privacy torts, the court in Midwest Glass then wrote: "[alpplying these concepts to the
instant case, it is obvious that we are concerned with the third category of invasion of privacy,
in particular, the public disclosure of a private debt." 34 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 339 N.E.2d at
277. "We therefore conclude that although an action for invasion of privacy based on the
public disclosure of private debts may be brought in Illinois the allegations contained in the
counterclaim do not substantiate such a tortious offense." Id. at 135, 339 N.E.2d at 278.
113. Id. After citing the Restatement (Second) and Prosser, which it noted recognized all
four prongs of invasion of privacy, the Midwest Glass court focused its discussion on public
disclosure of private facts and said nothing more about any of the other three privacy prongs.
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the Midwest Glass court's
discussion of false light as dicta. See Douglass v. Hustler Magazines, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1133(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986) (relying in part on Midwest Glass to recognize
plaintiff's false light claim). See generally Hanson, supra note 44 (author noted only that
Midwest Glass court recognized public disclosure of private facts as an invasion of privacy
tort).
114. See infra note 116 (discussing cases that addressed false light as though it was part of
Illinois common law).
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the existence of any privacy actions beyond commercial appropriation. " '
However, other Illinois appellate opinions considering false light construed
Midwest Glass' dicta as standing for something more, thus fostering a split
within the Illinois appellate courts after 1975. Indeed, five years after Midwest
Glass, an Illinois appellate court presumed that plaintiff's false light action
was appropriate under Illinois common law, and a federal court actually
recognized false light, purportedly applying Illinois common law." 6 Both
cases looked to Midwest Glass for support.17
In the state court case, Adreani v. Hansen,"8 three real estate developers
sued a private citizen and Pioneer Press, Inc., over a letter the citizen had
written to his community newspaper criticizing the developers' alleged greed
in a local park project. The plaintiffs sued for false light and libel, charging
that the publication falsely depicted them as ruthless businessmen trying to
bilk the public of money." 9 The state court held that plaintiffs had properly
pleaded false light based on the Midwest Glass dicta.' 0 Nonetheless, the
115. In 1976, a plaintiff-debtor alleged that a credit bureau had invaded her privacy. See
Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Il1. App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (4th Dist. 1976). The
court dismissed her false light claim as well as her privacy claims for public disclosure of
private facts and intrusion upon seclusion. The court said that in light of Eick v. Perk Dog
Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 142 (1952) (recognizing commercial appropriation of
name and likeness), there was neither precedent for, nor the need to create, additional remedies
for invasion of privacy beyond that provided by commercial appropriation. Four years later,
the court in Kelly v. Franco, 72 Il. App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (Ist Dist. 1979), observed,
based on Scott, that only commercial appropriation actions had been explicitly accepted in
Illinois. Id. at 646, 391 N.E.2d at 57-58.
The Kelly court also dismissed plaintiff's reliance on sections 6 and 12 of article I of the
Illinois Constitution, which recognize a privacy right and remedy, to support her privacy claims.
Id. at 644-45, 391 N.E.2d at 56-57. The Midwest Glass court had previously interpreted those
two sections as providing a general right of privacy in Illinois. 34 Il. App. 3d at 133, 339
N.E.2d at 276-77. In contrast, the Kelly court cited the record of the proceedings of the Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention, in which the sponsor of section 6 said that provision pertained
only to invasions of privacy by government of public officials. 72 11. App. 3d at 644-45, 391
N.E.2d at 56-57.
The pertinent part of section 6 provides: "The people shall have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures,
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means." ILL. CoNsr. 1970, art. I, § 6.
The Kelly court found that section 12 also did not create a new constitutional privacy right.
Section 12 provides: "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice
by law, freely, completely, and promptly." ILL. CoNsT. 1970, art. I, § 12.
116. Adreani v. Hansen, 80 11. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1st Dist. 1980), assumed false
light was part of Illinois common law based on Midwest Glass, as did a federal court purporting
to apply Illinois common law. See Cantrell v. ABC, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
117. Adreani, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 730, 400 N.E.2d at 682; Cantrell, 529 F. Supp. at 756.
118. Adreani, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 726-28, 400 N.E.2d at 681.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 730, 400 N.E.2d at 682.
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court denied plaintiffs' false light claim, because the project and the letter
were matters of public interest.''
One year after Adreani, a federal district court held that a plaintiff had
stated a cause of action for false light under Illinois common law. In Cantrell
v. ABC, Inc., 2  a diversity case, the plaintiff alleged that a segment of the
ABC television show 20/20 gave the false impression that plaintiff was
involved in an arson-for-profit scheme with a group of individuals who
actually were arsonists. The federal court followed the state court's inter-
pretation of Midwest Glass. The federal court read Midwest Glass as having
explicitly recognized all four invasion of privacy torts as actionable in Illinois,
and thus, because the plaintiff had properly pleaded false light, his claim
would not be denied under Illinois law. 23
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals later perpetuated the notion that
false light was actionable under Illinois common law when it decided the
case of Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc."4 In a new twist, however, the
Seventh Circuit did not rely solely on the dicta of Midwest Glass to recognize
false light.'" The Seventh Circuit also utilized its own interpretation of
Leopold v. Levin to reach its result.'12 The Seventh Circuit accepted that
while no Illinois appellate courts had explicitly recognized false light as a
cause of action, it had nonetheless been made a part of Illinois' common
law by the Illinois Supreme Court in Leopold fifteen years earlier.' 27
At issue in Douglass were nude photos of the plaintiff Robyn Douglass,
an actress and model. Although Douglass originally posed for the photos
for Playboy magazine, Hustler magazine subsequently acquired and pub-
lished them. 28 In a diversity suit in federal court, Douglass charged that
under Illinois common law Hustler cast her in a false light because the
photos could reasonably be seen to insinuate that she was a lesbian and that
she was the kind of person willing to be shown naked in a vulgar setting.' 2'
She also alleged commercial appropriation.'" Douglass won damages from
Hustler's publishing company, which appealed the decision.',
The Douglass court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action
under Illinois common law for both false light and commercial appropria-
121. Id. at 724, 400 N.E.2d at 683.
122. 592 F. Supp. 746, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
123. Id. at 756.
124. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied 475 U.S. 1094 (1986).
125. Id. at 1133-34.
126. Id.
127. The Seventh Circuit noted that in cases in which the false light tort has been charged,
although unsuccessfully, the "Illinois courts have proceeded as if it existed in Illinois" ever
since Leopold v. Levin, 45 I11. 2d 439, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970), "the only false-light case decided
by the Illinois Supreme court." Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133.
128. Id. at 1131-32.
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tion.11" The Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois Supreme Court considered
"the false-light tort ... part of the common law of Illinois,"' 33 and that
Illinois courts would recognize false light as soon as a suitable case arose."14
The Seventh Circuit also cited Adreani, Midwest Glass, and Cantrell for
support, observing that the latter two already recognized the existence of
false light in Illinois, even though Midwest Glass had done so only in dicta
and Cantrell was a federal, not a state case.'"
The following year, two appellate court opinions illustrated the continuing
split within the Illinois courts. In the first opinion, Melvin v. Burling,'"6 the
court held that false light did not exist in Illinois, the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Douglass notwithstanding. The Melvin court specifically found
that the false light area of privacy law had not been judicially accepted as
a cause of action in Illinois, noting that Leopold was an action for com-
mercial appropriation rather than for false light.' 37
In contrast, a second Illinois appellate opinion considered a plaintiff's
false light claim as though false light existed in Illinois, but did not find
that plaintiff had established a claim because the published information was
132. Id. at 1138. The Seventh Circuit also held that Douglass was a public figure who would
have to prove actual malice on the part of Hustler magazine regarding her false light claim.
Id. at 1140-41.
133. Id. at 1133.
134. Based on what it perceived as the Illinois Supreme Court's acceptance in Leopold v.
Levin, 45 I11. 2d 439, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970), of false light as part of Illinois' common law,
the Seventh Circuit noted that "almost all signs point to Illinois' recognizing [false light] when
a suitable case arises." Id. at 1134.
135. The Seventh Circuit cited Adreani v. Hanson, 80 I11. App. 3d 720, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1st
Dist. 1980), for the proposition that false light is part of the common law of Illinois, adding
that "Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Development Co. [34 II. App. 3d 130, 133, 339 N.E.2d
274, 277 (1975)] and Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Co. [529 F. Supp. 746, 756-59 (N.D.
Il1. 1981)), explicitly recognize the existence of the false-light tort in Illinois, though Midwest
Glass does so only in dictum and Cantrell is not a state-court case." Douglass, 769 F.2d at
1133.
136. 141 I1. App. 3d 786, 787, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (3d Dist. 1986). In Melvin, plaintiffs
asserted intrusion upon seclusion when defendant used plaintiffs' names without authority to
order numerous items through the mail, for which the plaintiffs later were billed. The trial
court held that such a tort did not exist in Illinois and dismissed the case for failure to state a
cause of action.
After discussing the facts of the Scott and Kelly cases, both which denied plaintiffs' intrusion
upon seclusion claims, the Melvin court analyzed the facts in light of Leopold, found that the
Illinois Supreme Court said nothing there that might preclude a court's recognizing intrusion
upon seclusion in Illinois, and so recognized the tort. Id. at 788, 490 N.E.2d at 1013.
137. The Melvin court wrote:
Our Supreme Court's only venture into the area of privacy law followed in Leopold
v. Levin. This case was similarly concerned with appropriation; however, at least
one court has considered the case as involving the area known as "false light." It
is generally accepted, however, that the false light area of privacy law has not, as
yet, been judicially accepted in Illinois as a cause of action.
141 I11. App. 3d at 787, 490 N.E.2d at 1012 (citing Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769
F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986).
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privileged."' In McGrew v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.," 9 the plaintiff sued
a creditor and the creditor's attorney for issuing garnishment summonses at
a time when the plaintiff owed them no money. The court held that because
the summonses were statements connected with judicial proceedings, the
defendants' conduct was privileged and plaintiff could not recover on his
false light claim. 40 Nonetheless, the opinion seemed to suggest that had the
statements not been privileged, the court would have recognized plaintiff's
false light claim. The court based its recognition of the tort on the Douglass
court's interpretation of false light's development in Illinois . 41
Thus, the state of false light in Illinois when Judge Berkos asserted his
false light claim was confused and in need of clarification. Many courts
continued to deny that the false light doctrine existed in Illinois, based on
their interpretation of Leopold as limiting the scope of the privacy action.' 42
Other courts, however, supported recognition of false light, based either on
the dicta of Midwest Glass or on the Seventh Circuit's questionable inter-
pretation of Leopold as making false light invasion of privacy actionable
under Illinois law.' 43
II. BERKos v. NBC, INc.
In the 10 p.m. newscast that spurred Judge Berkos to sue NBC and
newscaster Peter Karl, Karl reported that Chicago police officer Ira Black-
wood was indicted as part of the Greylord investigation into judicial cor-
138. McGrew v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 147 Il1. App. 3d 104, 497 N.E.2d 424 (1st Dist.
1986).
139. Id. at 106-08, 497 N.E.2d at 426-28.
140. The court in McGrew found that plaintiff had complained about statements and
inferences arising from the summonses themselves, which are court processes. The court reasoned
that court proceedings are protected from defamation actions by absolute privilege, and since
every jurisdiction that has considered this privilege has found that it also applies to false light
suits, plaintiff's false light claim had to fail. Id. at 114, 497 N.E.2d 432.
141. The McGrew court acknowledged that the Illinois appellate court, in Melvin v. Burling,
141 11. App. 3d 786, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1986), had found that false light had not yet
been judicially accepted in Illinois as a cause of action. However, the McGrew court cited the
Restatement (Second's) discussion of false light and then quoted at length the Seventh Circuit's
discussion of Leopold in its Douglass opinion, which ended with the Seventh Circuit's assertion
that the Illinois Supreme Court considered the false light tort to be part of the common law
of Illinois. McGrew, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 113-14, 497 N.E.2d at 431-32 (citing Douglass v.
Hustler Magazines, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094
(1986)).
142. Melvin v. Burling, 141 I1. App. 3d 786, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1986); Kelly v.
Franco, 72 II. App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (Ist Dist. 1979); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott,
36 II. App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37, 40 (4th Dist. 1976) (Craven, J., dissenting).
143. Cantrell v. ABC, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. III. 1981); McGrew v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., 147 I11. App. 3d 104, 497 N.E.2d 424 (1st Dist. 1986); Adreani v. Hansen, 80
Ill. App. 3d 726, 730, 400 N.E.2d 679, 683 (1st Dist. 1980).
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ruption and charged with ten counts of extortion and racketeering.1' The
government alleged that he had solicited and received $4,440 to influence
ten cases. All the charges involved pay-offs from undercover FBI Agent
David Ries. Karl named the judges who had heard certain cases that involved
144. The newscast's transcript read as follows:
CAROL MARIN: The Greylord investigation into judicial corruption is getting
bigger. Peter Karl reports new names of judges in court records, judges involved
in cases where pay-offs were allegedly made. Peter...
PETER KARL: Carol, sources in the legal community tell Channel Five News
that FBI Agents have been searching court records from the 2nd and 3rd District,
in Skokie and Niles. And we have also learned that the U.S. Attorney's Office is
getting more and more cooperation from more attorneys with knowledge of judicial
corruption.
And, tonight, we can report that we found the names of five more judges which
appear in cases where the FBI allegedly put in "the fix."
The new names of the judges surfaced in the case against Ira Blackwood, a
Chicago Police Officer assigned to Traffic Court, but a man believed to have
connections in many other courtrooms. The indictment against Blackwood charges
him with 10 counts of extortion and racketeering. The government alleges that he
solicited and received $4400 to influence t0 cases. All of the charges involve pay-
offs. . . . Judge John Murphy heard the cases; Judge Murphy was also indicted
last week. The Blackwood cases were used against him.
In another case, Judge Christy Berkos was on the bench at Branch 29 when
Kenneth Rollings who was charged with battery, was found "not guilty." It is
alleged that $500 was paid to influence that case.
Two cases involved Judge Daniel O'Brien, at Branch 23; the charges were battery.
A $400 and a $600 bribe were allegedly paid. Both defendants were found "not
guilty" by Judge O'Brien.
Judge Raymond Sadini [sic], of Branch 26, heard an FBI case of retail theft;
there was a $400 bribe allegedly paid. The case was dismissed with "leave to
reinstate" by Judge Sadini [sic).
Judge Martin Hogan heard two cases involving possession of a stolen auto; two
$600 bribes were allegedly paid. Both cases had a finding of "no probable cause";
they were dismissed by Judge Hogan.
Judge Arthur Ellis heard the final case, in Branch 45; it was a battery charge.
An alleged bribe of $400 was paid; the verdict was "not guilty." Judge Ellis said
he knows nothing about the case, he hasn't been contacted by the FBI and that he
hasn't talked to Blackwood, since he was assigned to 45.
And Circuit Court Judge Wayne Olson, who faces 55 counts of racketeering,
extortion and mail fraud, today, in an exclusive interview, said he'll be exonerated.
JUDGE WAYNE OLSON: I'm confident I'm innocent of all the charges, Peter.
And it is our intention to plead "not guilty" to all of them.
KARL: We talked with Judge Berkos tonight, just a few moments ago; he said
he substituted in Branch 29 a few times but that he doesn't know Ira Blackwood
or the FBI Agent Ries.
Attempts to reach the other judges failed. Judges Berkos, O'Brien, Hogan, Sadini
(sic] and Ellis have not been charged with any criminal wrongdoing. The FBI has
subpoenaed all the court records to these cases for the Greylord investigations.
Carol and Ron, the story intensifies.
Berkos v. NBC, Inc., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476, 481-82, 515 N.E.2d 668, 670-71 (1st Dist. 1987);
appeal denied, 119 Ill. 2d 553, 522 N.E.2d 1241 (1988).
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pay-offs, noting that plaintiffs in those cases were found "not guilty." Karl
reported that Judge Berkos was on the bench when defendant Kenneth
Rollings, who was charged with battery, was found "not guilty." Karl further
stated that the indictments alleged that $500 was paid to influence that case.
At the end of the broadcast, Karl said Berkos had not been charged with
any wrongdoing and that in an interview Berkos denied knowing either
Officer Blackwood or the FBI agent. The broadcast's video portion showed
a photograph of Berkos and the part of Blackwood's indictment referring
to Rollings' acquittal. 145 The trial court dismissed all four of Berkos' claims
relating to the broadcast.' 46
A. Berkos' Claims Other Than False Light
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the commercial
appropriation of name and likeness, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims, but reversed and remanded as to Berkos' libel and false light
claims. 47 Because the case was an appeal on the pleadings, the appellate
court focused on the threshold question of whether Berkos' complaint was
legally sufficient so as to entitle him to proceed on the merits of his claims.
Regarding the legal sufficiency of the complaint, NBC made two assertions
on appeal. First, that Berkos' libel claim failed to allege the specific state-
ments he claimed to be defamatory, and second that he failed to show that
NBC and Karl had acted with actual malice. 148
The appellate court, however, was unpersuaded. The court found that
although Berkos' pleading was technically defective because it failed to allege
the specific statements that were libel per se, the videotape was sufficient to
constitute libel per se.' 49 As to whether Berkos showed that NBC and Karl
had acted with actual malice, the court declined to find that Karl "could
not have had a high degree of awareness that his allegedly false, defamatory
remarks ... were probably untrue."'' 0 Thus, while conceding that Berkos
might be unable to prove actual malice, the court stressed that he had
pleaded it sufficiently to state a cause of action.' 5'
145. See supra note 144.
146. 161 Il. App, 3d at 480, 515 N.E.2d at 669.
147. Id. at 480-81, 515 N.E.2d at 670.
148. Id. at 484-88, 515 N.E.2d at 672-74.
149. Id. at 486, t15 N.E.2d at 673.
150. Id. at 489, 515 N.E.2d at 675.
151. The Berkos court stated:
We are not prepared to find at this preliminary juncture in these proceedings that
Karl clearly and unequivocally could not have had a high degree of awareness that
his allegedly false, defamatory remarks involving Berkos were probably untrue.
"Although plaintiff might be unable to prove actual malice, it appears that he did
plead actual malice sufficiently to state a cause of action .... "
Berkos, 161 111. App. 3d at 489, 515 N.E.2d at 675 (quoting Davis v. Keystone Printing Serv.,
Inc., 111 I1. App. 3d 427, 443, 444 N.E.2d 253, 263 (1982)) (emphasis in original).
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NBC also raised three affirmative defenses: that the broadcast could be
given a reasonable innocent construction under Illinois' common law re-
quirements; was substantially true; and was privileged as a fair, accurate
report of judicial records.' 52 As to NBC's first affirmative defense, the court
found that a reasonable person could construe the broadcast's remarks as
libelous, based on the court's application of the innocent construction rule, 53
thus leaving to the jury the question of defamation. 4 NBC's second defense
was that the newscast was substantially true. The court found that the public
records relied on in the report neither suggested nor implied that Berkos
may have accepted a bribe, nor did those reports suggest that Berkos was
under federal indictment or even was suspected of corruption in Operation
Greylord.'" Finally, the court rejected NBC's attempt to raise the fair report
privilege, finding that the broadcast's allegedly libelous innuendo was absent
from the public documents relied on by NBC. 56
B. Berkos' False Light Claim
In recognizing Berkos' false light claim as a cause of action, the Berkos
court derived the elements of such an action from the Restatement (Second)
of the Law of Torts.5 7 The court then concluded that Berkos' complaint
152. Id.
153. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing innocent construction rule). The
Berkos court found that under the innocent construction rule, the interpretation offered by
NBC and Karl was "strained" and placed "an undue emphasis upon certain portions of the
references to Berkos, without due regard to the remainder of the broadcast's overall context."
Berkos, 161 I1. App. 3d at 486, 515 N.E.2d at 673.
154. Id. at 485.86, 515 N.E.2d at 673.
155. The Berkos court wrote:
In order to prevail on this defense, NBC and Karl would be required to show that
their allegedly defamatory remarks about Berkos were substantially true. However,
NBC and Karl do not contend, suggest, or imply that Berkos may indeed have
"accepted a bribe" from Blackwood "to fix" the Rollings case, nor do they assert
that Berkos was under federal indictment, investigation, or suspicion as a "corrupt
judge" in Operation Greylord for this reason. As a result, we conclude that the
assumed affirmative defense of substantial truth was not shown as a matter of law
in the affidavits of Karl and the NBC research associate, and that Berkos' libel
claim should not have been dismissed on this ground.
161 I1. App. 3d at 494, 515 N.E.2d at 679.
156. The Berkos court noted:
We are unable to conclude that Karl's references to Berkos, in their overall context,
fall within the scope of the fair report privilege. Karl's allegedly defamatory
imputation of bribery to Berkos is not found in any of the documents attached to
the motion to dismiss of NBC and Karl. . . .As Karl himself stated in his affidavit,
the "broadcast in question [wasi based on what [he] believe[d] to be the truth about
the Blackwood indictment and the incidents underlying it. " Karl's allegedly false
and defamatory accusation of or criminal imputation to Berkos was "based only
on an inference drawn by the speaker" [here, NBC and Karl].
161 III. App. 3d at 492-93, 515 N.E.2d at 677-78 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 496, 515 N.E.2d at 680.
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"contained sufficient factual allegations to satisfy the applicable stan-
dard. '5 M To demonstrate that Illinois courts were prepared to recognize false
light, the court cited McGrew, 5 9 a case which reversed plaintiff's false light
claim but presumed nonetheless that false light was part of Illinois common
law. '60
The majority opinion generated a dissent. Judge Jiganti dissented and
stated that he would have dismissed Berkos' libel and false light claims.",
He found that the facts that tainted Berkos emanated not from the newscast,
but from the indictment returned in the United States District Court against
police officer Blackwood."12 He determined that the newscast did nothing
more than explain the circumstances surrounding Blackwood's indictment.
Thus, the newscast could be interpreted as no more than a report of the
charges against Blackwood and, therefore, did not place Berkos in a false
light. 63 Judge Jiganti did not, however, base his reasoning on the fact that
Illinois did not recognize false light as a cause of action.
III. ANAiysxs
A. Berkos' False Light Holding Generally
The Berkos court found that because his complaint satisfied the applicable
false light elements found in the Restatement (Second), Berkos' false light
claim had to be remanded along with his libel claim, as both failed to
withstand the fair report privilege.'" The court rejected NBC's argument
that no Illinois decision had recognized the tort of false light invasion of
privacy and the defendants advanced no other reason not to recognize false
light in Illinois. 65 Finally, the court stated that it declined to affirm the trial
court's dismissal of Berkos' false light claim, and relied on the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Douglass as support for its holding.'"
The Berkos court's case for recognizing false light was flimsy. The court
apparently accepted the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Leopold-that
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing McGrew v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 147 I1. App. 3d 104, 497 N.E.2d
424 (1st Dist. 1986)).
160. Id.
161. Id. 497-98, 515 N.E.2d at 681 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 498, 515 N.E.2d at 681.
164. Id. at 496, 515 N.E.2d at 680.
165. The Berkos court wrote:
Although NBC and Karl caution that no Illinois decision has recognized the tort
of false light as a cause of action, they advance no other ground to refuse recognition
of such a claim in this jurisdiction. Accordingly we decline to affirm the trial
court's dismissal of Berkos' false light claim on this basis.
Id. (citing Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1094 (1986); Melvin v. Burling, 141 11. App. 3d 786, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1986)).
166. Id. at 496, 515 N.E.2d at 680.
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the Illinois Supreme Court considered false light to be part of Illinois
common law and meant for a false light cause of action to be recognized
as soon as a "suitable case" arose. The Berkos court also cited Melvin v.
.6urling, which disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of false
light's development in Illinois but failed to distinguish the case properly. 16
Just as NBC failed to offer a reason not to allow Berkos' false light claim,
other than the fact that no Illinois court had ever recognized the tort of
false light, the court in Berkos failed to offer substantive reasons for
recognizing false light.'" Because Berkos is the first Illinois appellate decision
to recognize false light as a cause of action, it is curious that the court
declined to use this opportunity to set forth a strong, or at least basic,
rationale for recognizing false light.16 9
Because the Berkos court was determining not whether Berkos had proved
his case, but merely whether he pleaded it properly, one might argue that it
did not have to be specific. This argument is undermined, however, by the
fact that the court was specific in detailing why Berkos should be allowed
to proceed with his libel claim. 7 0 Additionally, the court specified precisely




169. Other than the court's remarks contained in supra note 165, the Berkos court cited the
Restatement (Second), noted the elements of a false light claim listed, and held the following:
In our view Berkos' complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to satisfy
the applicable standard. Furthermore, as stated above, we conclude that the broad-
cast's references to Berkos do not fall within the scope of the common law fair
report privilege. As a result, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of Berkos' false
light claim and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 4. at § 652E comment d; McGrew v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 147 Il1. App. 3d 104, 497 N.E.2d 424 (1st Dist. 1986)).
170. Berkos, 161 Il1. App. 3d at 483-89, 515 N.E.2d at 672-75. See supra notes 151-55 and
accompanying text (discussing Berkos' libel claim).
171. As for Berkos' commercial appropriation claim, the court noted that such a claim could
not be stated where a plaintiff's name or likeness has been used as a part of a "vehicle of
information," such as the news media. Berkos, 161 Il. App. 3d at 495, 515 N.E.2d at 679.
The court distinguished the use of Berkos' photograph by NBC and Karl from the commercial
use made of plaintiff's likeness in Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d
742 (1952), the first Illinois case to recognize commercial appropriation of name and likeness
in Illinois. The Berkos court further noted that even NBC's use of "teasers" or "hype" spot
advertisements to increase viewer share of the 10 p.m. broadcast was not tantamount to
commercial appropriation. 161 Il. App. 3d at 495-96, 515 N.E.2d at 679-80.
As for Berkos' emotional distress claim, the court set out the facts he had to have alleged
to make out such a claim: i) defendant's conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to exceed
all possible bounds of decency; 2) the emotional distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it; and, 3) defendant intended to inflict this distress or was
substantially certain the conduct would result in severe distress. Berkos, 161 Il. App. 3d at
496-97, 515 N.E.2d at 680 (citing Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90, 360
N.E.2d 765, 767 (1976)). The court found, based on its review of Berkos' other claims, that
he failed to satisfy these criteria. Id. at 496-97, 515 N.E.2d at 680.
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For the court then to recognize Berkos' false light claim in such a seemingly
cavalier manner is difficult to understand. However, if the Berkos court
believed, as the Seventh Circuit did, that false light already was part of
Illinois common law, and that recognition of false light as a cause of action
was a mere formality requiring little justification, the opinion is more
acceptable.72 Indeed, this is the only satisfactory explanation for the Berkos
court's sparse reasoning-especially because this is the same court which was
so careful when it recognized public disclosure of private facts for the first
time in Midwest Glass. 7
B. Berkos' False Light Holding Falls Short
The Berkos court failed to address several important considerations. First,
by failing to analyze the precedent of Leopold and its progeny to discern
guiding principles, the Berkos court failed to clarify the status and history
of false light in Illinois. The court chose instead to rely on the Seventh
Circuit's debatable interpretation of Leopold. Second, the Berkos court
entirely ignored the fact that NBC's newscast involved a newsworthy event.
This is an important policy consideration that Illinois courts prior to Berkos
generally found outweighed the privacy interests of false light plaintiffs. 7 4
Finally, the Berkos court failed to examine how other jurisdictions had
treated false light. Had they done so, the court would have found that the
scope of false light appears to be contracting.'"7 Moreover, while valid reasons
exist for recognizing a false light tort, other, equally compelling reasons exist
for denying such a tort.
1. Berkos did not Examine False Light's Development in Illinois
Because Illinois appellate courts are split over whether false light is a part
of Illinois common law, it was incumbent on the Berkos court to examine
for itself Leopold and subsequent opinions addressing false light. Instead,
the Berkos court accepted the Seventh Circuit's view of the history of false
light in Illinois. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's version of history is
based on a peculiar-and debatable-interpretation of Illinois "prece-
dent."' 7 6 A close look at false light in Illinois indicates that, contrary to the
Seventh Circuit's view, the Illinois Supreme Court was wary of the false
172. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's interpretation
of the Illinois Supreme Court's treatment of false light in Leopold).
173. See Midwest Glass v. Stanford, 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 133-35, 339 N.E.2d 274, 277-78
(1st Dist. 1975).
174. See supra note 3 (listing Illinois cases prior to Berkos that found the press' right to
publish newsworthy information outweighed privacy rights).
175. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text (canvassing other jurisdictions on the
claim of false light).
176. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's view of
Leopold decision and false light in Illinois).
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light tort and likely did not intend for it to be actionable in Illinois. Moreover,
the Illinois opinions indicate that the courts were even more reluctant to
recognize a false light claim that involves the press' right to publish matters
of public interest. "'
To support its recognition of Berkos' false light claim, the Berkos court
cited the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Douglass which presumed that false
light was a part of Illinois common law. 78 The Seventh Circuit's reasoning
in support of this proposition was that the Illinois Supreme Court recognized
false light as part of Illinois common law in Leopold.' 79This interpretation
of Leopold, however thoughtful, does not appear to be at all what the
Illinois Supreme Court intended.'8 0 In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court did
not even regard Leopold as a false light case but, instead, as one for
commercial appropriation of name and likeness and, possibly, public disclo-
sure of private facts.' The Leopold court dismissed outright the notion that
the novel and film versions of "Compulsion" portrayed Leopold in a false
light, and expressed reluctance to recognize his commercial appropriation
and public disclosure claims as well.'"
177. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois Supreme Court's view
of invasion of privacy and competing right of press to publish matters of public interest).
178. Berkos, 161 11. App. 3d 476, 496, 515 N.E.2d 668, 680 (1987); see supra notes 165 and
169 (Berkos court's discussion of Judge Berkos' false light claim).
179. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.. 769 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1094 (1986); see supra notes 124-135 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Douglass).
180. See Leopold v. Levin, 45 11. 2d 434, 442-46, 259 N.E.2d 250, 255-56 (1970). See supra
notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing Leopold court's treatment of privacy rights in
Illinois and in other jurisdictions). See also Hanson, supra note 44. The author argued that the
Illinois Supreme Court in Leopold determined that "once a party is a public figure whose
many actions are newsworthy, that party always remains a public figure for those events, and
he will not be allowed to return to the private sector." Id. at 97 (citing Leopold v. Levin, 45
Ill. App. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970)). Nowhere did Hanson find that the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized Leopold's claim as one for false light, or that the court recognized false light
In general. Rather, Hanson noted that the Illinois Supreme Court concluded the following in
Leopold:
[W]hile recognizing the right of privacy, the right had not been expanded in Illinois
beyond the original pronouncement in Eick. . . . Because the plaintiff was a public
figure due to his prior criminal conduct, he remained a public figure thereafter and
no right of privacy existed in matters associated with his participation in a highly
publicized crime. Although the right was not extended to plaintiff Leopold, a public
figure, the right was clearly recognized with this limitation, for the people of Illinois.
Id. at 97-98.
181. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois Supreme Court's
treatment of privacy rights).
182. See supra notes 103-05 (discussing Leopold court's treatment of Leopold's three privacy
claims). Ina 1974 survey of books on the first amendment and the media, one commentator
briefly discussed the Leopold case. See Wilson, Survey of Legal Literature, 23 DEPAUL L. REv.
1155, 1157-58 (1974). Wilson noted that the Illinois Supreme Court rejected all three of Leopold's
privacy claims-commercial appropriation, false light, and fictionalization that outraged rea-
sonable standards of decency. He suggested that privacy in Illinois might be moving toward
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In light of the Illinois Supreme Court's reluctance in Leopold, the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of that court's opinion as making false light part of
Illinois' common law appears faulty. The Seventh Circuit, however, aug-
mented its contention that the Leopold court believed false light to be a part
of Illinois common law, by pointing out the following: Leopold "had
forfeited any right of privacy by the notoriety of his crime; the book was
represented to the public as a fictionalized rather than literal account;
Leopold was a public figure; and to award tort damages would have unduly
limited freedom of expression.'1 3 To support its argument, the Seventh
Circuit explained that "these points would have been unnecessary [for the
extinction, as indicated by the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Leopold. He appears correct
in perceiving the Illinois Supreme Court as wary of privacy claims based on its cautious tone
in the Leopold opinion.
Wilson's interpretation of the Illinois Supreme Court's disposition of Leopold's false light
and "fictionalization" claims is misleading, however, and should be clarified. He observed that
the Illinois Supreme Court was so "predisposed" to defendant's position that it characterized
the "Compulsion" material "as true against a 'fictionalization' attack but, on the other hand,
as fiction as against plaintiff's asserted use of Time, Inc. v. Hill." Id. at 1158. It should be
noted, however, that it was not the Illinois Supreme Court that characterized Leopold's claims
as both true and false, but Leopold himself.
Although Leopold characterized one of his three claims as "fictionalization," he based his
argument on Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940), a public disclosure of private facts case. The Illinois Supreme Court, thus, appropriately
read that particular claim as one for public disclosure of private facts, a point Wilson appears
inadvertently to obscure. The court noted that the allegedly offensive "fictionalization" was
derived from the facts of Leopold's life. Leopold, 45 Ill. 2d at 443-44, 259 N.E.2d at 255-56.
Contrary to Wilson's interpretation, Leopold did not dispute this, since Leopold's major
contention in that claim was that defendant had exposed so much of Leopold's private life that
it caused the public to identify him with episodes of the novel and film that were so offensive
and unwarranted as to "outrage the community's notions of decency." Id. Thus, the court
found that while the material was published as fiction (hence, Leopold's characterization of
this claim as "fictionalization"), it was, at the same time, based on Leopold's actual crime
and life afterward. While the court quoted the Sidis opinion's characterization of public
disclosure, that some revelations may be so offensive as to be tortious, the court also observed
that for Leopold to make such an argument "must be regarded as fanciful," considering that
the core of the novel and film were a part of his life that he had caused to be placed in public
view, and that his notorious crime was a matter of public record and interest. Id.
The court explained further that Leopold's false light claim also must fail, because defendant
portrayed Leopold's crime and life as fictional from the outset, and that false light as Leopold
had alleged it applied only when something false was represented as true, which was not the
case here. Id. at 444-46, 259 N.E.2d at 256-57. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court's
disposition of Leopold's public disclosure of private facts and false light claims was consistent.
Moreover, it is common for plaintiffs to allege both a false light and a public disclosure
claim. The plaintiff in Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1007, 345
N.E.2d 37, 38 (4th Dist. 1976), brought an action alleging false light and public disclosure of
private facts. Most important, the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Leopold reflected its
unwillingness to recognize an expansion of the right of privacy in Illinois to includeeither false
light or public disclosure of private facts as a cause of action, as Wilson suggested.
183. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1094 (1986).
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Illinois Supreme Court] to make if the court had thought that the false-light
tort was not part of the common law of Illinois. ' 'IM This assertion, however,
reads too much into the Illinois Supreme Court's remarks in Leopold, and
isolates them in a misleading manner. Although the Leopold court found
the fact that the book and film had been represented as fictional relevant
only when considering Leopold's false light claim," 5 it found the other points
singled out by the Seventh Circuit-those referring to the public interest in
Leopold's crime and his status as a public figure-relevant to each of
Leopold's three separate privacy claims.8 6 Thus, the court's main thrust was
to limit the general privacy right it was recognizing, rather than to delineate
distinct privacy torts.
Moreover, the Berkos court completely ignored the cautionary tenor and
language of the Leopold opinion. The Illinois Supreme Court in Leopold
stressed that courts in Illinois should approach with caution any expansion
of privacy beyond commercial appropriation. 8 7 Even as the court recognized
a right to privacy, it reiterated the limits to that right where, as in Berkos,
the plaintiff was a public figure whose affairs certainly were a matter of
public interest.' Most significantly, Leopold noted that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill stood foremost for its careful
consideration of the effect of the constitutional guarantees for speech and
press on the scope of privacy rights. 9 Thus, despite the Seventh Circuit's
disingenuous reading of Leopold as sanctioning the false light tort, a closer
look reveals that the Leopold court did not recognize the tort, and, in fact,
explicitly directed Illinois courts that might consider doing so to act with
care.'9
Aside from misconstruing Leopold because of its reliance on the Seventh
Circuit's flawed interpretation, the Berkos court should not have recognized
false light without also attempting to reconcile-or at least examine-the
conflict between Illinois courts which denied the existence of false light and
those which "proceeded as if [false light] existed in Illinois."' 9 None of the
Illinois appellate cases that proceeded as if false light already existed in
184. Id.
185. Leopold, 45 Il. 2d at 445, 259 N.E.2d at 256.
186. Id. at 440-45, 259 N.E.2d at 254-56.
187. Id. at 44041, 259 N.E.2d at 254. See supra note 106 (discussing Leopold court's
reasoning supporting a cautious approach to expansion of privacy rights in Illinois).
188. Leopold, 45 111. 2d at 440-41, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
189. The Illinois Supreme Court said that in Hill "the right of privacy when involved with
the publication of a matter of public interest was viewed narrowly and cautiously by the [United
States Supreme Court]." Id. at 442, 259 N.E.2d at 255.
190. Id. at 440-41, 259 N.E.2d at 254; see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text
(discussing Leopold court's treatment of privacy rights in Illinois as compared with press' right
to publish matters of public interest in light of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
191. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1094 (1986); see supra notes 142-43 (listing cases that deny existence of false light in
Illinois and those that have proceeded as if it existed).
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Illinois actually recognized the tort.'9 Instead, they relied on the dicta of
Midwest Glass."3 Moreover, the Midwest Glass dicta itself is based on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and not on the holding of any Illinois court."'
Thus, the line of Illinois cases that presumes the existence of false light in
Illinois does not have its roots in Illinois common law at all, but instead, in
one court's dicta regarding the Restatement (Second).
2. Berkos Failed to Address the Issue of Public Interest
Even if one agreed with the Seventh Circuit's prediction that "almost all
signs point to Illinois' recognizing [false light] when a suitable case arises,"' 9'
it is doubtful whether Berkos was that "suitable" case. Berkos involved a
matter of legitimate public interest. Illinois courts, from Eick through Ad-
reani, had limited privacy rights whenever they involved newsworthy mat-
ters.' 96
Indeed, had the Berkos court heeded Leopold's cautionary guidance,"' it
would have addressed the Illinois Supreme Court's pivotal concern-that
privacy rights are greatly limited where the plaintiff is a public figure, or
one whose affairs are a matter of public interest. In view of the fact that
Judge Berkos was mentioned in the context of Operation Greylord, certainly
a matter of considerable public interest and scrutiny, the Berkos court failed,
at the very least, to explain why Berkos was a suitable case in which to
recognize false light for the first time.
3. Berkos' Treatment of False Light is Inconsistent with Other
Jurisdictions
Allowing plaintiffs to assert false light is especially desirable in instances
in which a publication, while not defamatory, is highly offensive due to the
nature and extent of the intrusion."98 The plaintiff and his family in Time,
Inc. v. Hill presented such a claim. While the Life magazine article did not
192. McGrew v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 147 I11. App. 3d 104, 497 N.E.2d 424 (1st Dist.
1986); Adreani v. Hansen, 80 Ill. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1st Dist. 1980). Although the
court in Cantrell v. ABC, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. I11. 1981). actually recognized false
light as a cause of action under Illinois common law by relying on Midwest Glass, Cantrell
was a federal court, not a state court, case.
193. The courts in Cantrell and Andreani explicitly relied on the dicta of Midwest Glass. See
Cantrell, 529 F. Supp. at 682; Andreani, 80 I11. App. 3d at 730, 400 N.E.2d at 682. Although
the McGrew opinion relied explicitly on the Seventh Circuit reasoning in Douglass, the McGrew
court also cited Midwest Glass for support in its favorable consideration of false light. See
McGrew, 147 111. App. 3d at 113, 497 N.E.2d at 431.
194. Midwest Glass v. Stanford, 34 II1. App. 3d 130, 133, 339 N.E.2d 274, 277 (lst Dist.
1975).
195. Douglass, 769 F. 2d at 1134.
196. See supra note 3 (discussing Illinois cases, including Adreani, which refused to recognize
plaintiffs' privacy rights in favor of newsworthy matters of public interest).
197. Leopold v. Levin, 45 I11. 2d 434, 440-41, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1970).
198. See Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 26, at 374-77.
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portray the Hill family negatively or in a way that harmed their reputations,
it did intrude upon their privacy by portraying them falsely in a national
publication after they had tried to avoid public scrutiny.'" Thus, as the
Seventh Circuit pointed out in Douglass, false light appears to be an appro-
priate form of redress for those who wish to be left alone but who are
portrayed to the public in a false and offensive manner.2
On the other hand, the false light claim may have greater potential than
libel to restrict the press' freedom to publish matters it deems interesting or
important. Where the allegedly false portrayals are not serious or derogatory,
the harm to the plaintiff does not seem to justify the imposition of liability
on the press and the potential chilling effect of such impositions. Based on
this consideration, the North Carolina Supreme Court abolished false light
as a tort in 1984 and articulated two reasons for doing so.2 1 First, the court
noted that any right to recover for false light invasion of privacy would
duplicate an existing right of recovery for defamation or overlap significantly
with such rights. Second, the court held that to allow damages in false light
cases in which plaintiffs were not libeled would add to the already existing
tension between the first amendment and libel. 2
Other jurisdictions have followed North Carolina's lead. Some refuse to
accept false light as a tort,"3 one limits false light claims,2 and still others
199. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967) (discussing false light).
200. Douglass, 769 F. 2d at 1133-34; see supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing
libel and false light).
201. Renwick v. News and Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984).
202. Id. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at 412-13. The North Carolina Supreme Court also suggested
that recognition of false light claims would reduce judicial efficiency by requiring courts to
consider two claims for the same relief which, if not identical, would differ very little. Id. at
326, 312 S.E.2d at 414. Supporting the notion that libel and false light claims do not differ
significantly, some courts have held that where plaintiffs have alleged both libel and false light
claims that the defenses or privileges that apply to libel apply to false light as well, as long as
the language at issue in both claims is the same. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Chase, 12 Med. L.
Rep. 1732 (4th Dist. 1986) (false light invasion of privacy claim that rests on same facts as
libel cause of action is subject to same immunity and defenses); Jensen v. Times Mirror, 634
F. Supp. 304 (D. Conn.), reconsidered, 647 F. Supp. 1525 (D. Conn. 1986) (privacy and
defamation actions, when based on same facts, are subject to same standards, and defendants
may challenge invasion of privacy claims on same grounds as they challenge defamation actions).
203. See, e.g., Angelotta v. ABC, Inc., 14 Med. L. Rep. 1185 (6th Cir. 1987) (Ohio does
not recognize false light); Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 12 Med. L. Rep. 1303, (Mo.
Ct. App.), aff'd 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1986) (lower court found false light tort not recognized
in Missouri; Missouri Supreme Court did not reject false light tort because statements in suit
were not actionable by reason of two-year libel statute of limitations); Price v. Viking Press,
12 Med. L. Rep. 1689 (D. Minn. 1985) (federal court followed state's long-standing refusal to
recognize false light).
204. See, e.g., Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 234, 721 P.2d 97 (1986) (public
policy and legislative intent require false light claims to be subject to the special-damages
requirement of California libel law which was passed to protect press' freedom); see also Note,
Invasion of Privacy: False Light Offers False Hope, 8 Loy. ENr. L.J. 411 (1988) (discussing
Fellows case).
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decline to decide whether false light is actionable.)s Thus, while Berkos has
recognized false light in Illinois, the trend elsewhere has been to reject or
restrict the false light tort.
Nonetheless, even commentators who support granting the press wide
latitude in exercising its first amendment rights suggest that to abolish false
light entirely may be going too far.2°6 These commentators reason that there
should be room for protecting the "private persona from public scrutiny."2'
Accordingly, the fundamental issue is whether the communication is privacy-
invading, just as the basic issue in a libel action is whether the words evoke
a defamatory meaning. If the communication is deemed privacy-invading,
then and only then should one examine whether the communication is false
and offensive.2 This viewpoint reflects a growing body of scholarship which
advocates judicial rejection of what is seen as a superficial link between libel
and false light. 209 Instead, these commentators urge courts to focus on false
light's similarity to the related privacy tort of public disclosure of private
facts, since both protect the same right-to be left alone and free from
unwarranted publicity. These interests differ from the interest in reputation,
which is at issue in libel cases.
The practical effect of such a view would be to require false light plaintiffs
to prove actual malice in actions that involve a matter of public interest. In
such cases, a plaintiff would be entitled to less protection because he cannot
claim that a communication is privacy-invading if it belongs legitimately tO
the public domain. Because newsworthiness is the accepted defense in public
disclosure cases, the parallel in false light actions would be the Time, Inc.
v. Hill matter-of-public-interest standard, thus providing the "appropriate
conceptualization of false light as an offshoot or derivative of the disclosure
tort.Y0210
205. See, e.g., Fox Tree v. Harte-Hanks Communications, 398 Mass. 845, 501 N.E.2d 519
(1986) (court did not decide whether false light cognizable); Prescott v. Bay St. Louis News-
papers, 13 Med. L. Rep. 1645 (Miss. 1986) (Mississippi Supreme Court, noting Renwick and
Sullivan opinions, did not recognize false light as actionable because facts in Prescott set forth
no falsity).
206. See Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 26, at 382.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 377.
209. Id. at 353-58, 375-80. The commentators whose scholarship Walden & Netzhammer cite
include: Ashdown, supra note 60; Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict
in Values, 20 N.Y.L.F. 453 (1975); Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press,
14 HsAtv. C.R.-C.L. L. RPv. 329 (1979); Kalven, supra note 47; Nimmer, supra note 9.
210. Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 26, at 379. As for false light actions that do not
concern matters of public interest, the authors suggest that a negligence standard should be
applied, in accord with several courts. Id. at 378-80. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1984); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse, 525 F. Supp. 585, 60A (D.
Md. 1981), rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982); Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
518 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (D.D.C. 1981); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.,
623 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
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Another approach would be to deny false light actions categorically which
involve matters of public interest. This view is in accord with the Illinois
precedent set forth in Leopold"2 1 ' because the cases cited therein denied
plaintiffs' privacy (and false light) claims whenever they concerned matters
of public interest. 12 Based on Illinois precedent, and underscored by the
Illinois Supreme Court's cautionary note in Leopold, Illinois courts may
want to recognize plaintiffs' false light claims as long as they do not involve
newsworthy matters of public interest. Thus, even if it were appropriate for
Illinois appellate courts to recognize false light, recognizing false light in the
Berkos case was inappropriate because the published matter was not private,
but of public interest.
IV. IMPACT
It is likely that plaintiffs in Illinois will continue to bring false light
actions. The fact that Illinois had not recognized the tort as a cause of
action prior to Berkos apparently did not discourage plaintiffs from bringing
false light actions.213 It remains to be seen, however, whether Illinois courts
will be more inclined to recognize plaintiffs' false light claims, Berkos
notwithstanding, especially when they involve matters of legitimate public
interest. Because the Berkos opinion did not address the substantive merits
of that claim, but merely rendered Judge Berkos' false light pleading effec-
tive, it is difficult to predict what the impact will be.
If Illinois courts look to Berkos for guidance, they will in effect be looking
to the Seventh Circuit's Douglass opinion. If Illinois courts look to Leopold
for guidance, they may find themselves at odds with the Berkos holding, at
least where false light claims involve matters of public interest. While Leopold
did not preclude courts from recognizing false light, the opinion included a
caveat to defer to the press in cases dealing with newsworthy events or
matters of legitimate public interest.
However, allowing a plaintiff to plead false light is only the first half of
the decision. The second, more significant issue still facing Illinois courts is
to determine which plaintiffs must prove actual malice: all plaintiffs, based
on Hill;2 1 4 or only public figures and officials, based on Gertz.2 1 This choice
is critical, because it will determine how the privacy rights of plaintiffs will
be balanced against the first amendment rights of the press.
As noted, the Gertz standard for libel, which allows private individuals
to prove mere negligence rather than actual malice, may have rendered the
211. See supra note 3 (listing Illinois cases that denied plaintiffs' privacy claims if they
involved matters of public interest).
212. Id.
213. Adreani v. Hansen, 80 Il1. App. 3d 726, 400 N.E.2d 679 (1st Dist. 1980); Bureau of
Credit Control v. Scott, 36 I11. App. 3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (4th Dist. 1976); Midwest Glass
v. Stanford, 34 Ill. App. 3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274 (Ist Dist. 1975).
214. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
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Hill false light standard invalid.216 The Seventh Circuit in Douglass followed
Gertz and found that the constitutional requirements of libel actions apply
to false light claims, at least as far as requiring public figures and officials
to prove actual malice. 217 The Seventh Circuit declined, however, to answer
the question of whether a private individual alleging false light also must
prove actual malice. 2 1
In contrast, the court in Berkos applied the Hill standard for actual malice,
perhaps unwittingly, by applying the Restatement (Second's) elements to
determine whether Judge Berkos had properly pleaded false light.219 The
Restatement (Second) suggests that all false light plaintiffs, private individuals
as well as public figures and officials, must prove actual malice.Y2 Thus, the
Berkos court, by effectively adopting the actual malice standard for all
plaintiffs, comports with the Illinois Supreme Court's desire, as stressed by
the Leopold court, to limit privacy rights.Y'
Further, it is reasonable for Illinois courts to require false light plaintiffs
to prove actual malice, at least with regard to matters of public interest.
First, false light is not as serious an injury as that of libel and therefore
should require a higher threshold of proof."" Second, mere personal annoy-
ance at reports involving matters of legitimate public interest should not be
allowed to outweigh the protections offered by the first amendment. This is
especially so given the historical interpretation of the first amendment as
affording the press a newsworthiness privilege where matters of public interest
are involved.2 3
216. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing whether Gertz actual malice
standard for libel cast doubt on Hill actual malice standard for false light invasion of privacy).
217. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F. 2d 1128, 1140 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1094 (1986).
218. Id. at 1141.
219. Berkos v. NBC, Inc., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476, 496, 515 N.E.2d 668, 680 (1st Dist. 1987),
appeal denied, 119 111. 2d 553, 522 N.E.2d 1241 (1988).
220. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 4, at § 652E.
221. Leopold v. Levin, 45 II1. 2d 434, 441, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1970); see supra notes 180-
81 (discussing Illinois Supreme Court's treatment of privacy rights in Illinois).
222. See, e.g., Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 26, at 356. One of the reasons offered
for requiring all plaintiffs alleging false light to prove actual malice, even in light of the Gertz
holding requiring that private plaintiffs need only prove negligence in libel suits, is that "the
injury is not so serious when the statement is not defamatory." REsTATEmENT (SecoD), supra
note 4, at § 652E. Walden & Netzhammer, who believe all plaintiffs should have to prove
actual malice when alleging false light, as long as the publication involves a matter of public
interest, assert that ". . . false light results in a somewhat lesser degree of harm to personal
interests." Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 26, at 356.
223. See supra note 3 (listing Illinois cases in which newsworthy matters of public interest
superceded plaintiffs' privacy interests). One commentator, Zimmerman, suggests that the
history of first amendment protection for the press neither supports nor justifies tort liability
for true speech, i.e., public disclosure of private facts. See Zimmerman, supra note 73, at 304-
06. Another commentator, Nimmer, applies this viewpoint to false light as well. He suggests
that since false light is more akin to public disclosure than libel, and since false light and public
disclosure protect privacy interests rather than reputation, the same first amendment concerns
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Thus, it is appropriate to require all false light plaintiffs in Illinois to
prove actual malice where matters of public interest are at issue. The
application of this standard strikes the appropriate balance between the
individual's privacy interest and the press' first amendment rights. Plaintiffs'
privacy rights will be preserved because they will be able to plead false light
even if they have not been libeled. Yet, the press' right to publish matters
of public interest will be preserved by requiring all plaintiffs who sue the
press for false light to prove actual malice.
V. CONCLUSION
By failing to support its recognition of false light with reasoned analysis
or precedent other than the Seventh Circuit Douglass opinion, the Berkos
court recklessly expanded the common law right to privacy and provided no
guiding rationale for future courts. The Berkos court failed to explain its
reasoning when it recognized false light. The court instead relied on the
Seventh Circuit's faulty interpretation of false light in Illinois as set out in
Douglass. Thus, the Berkos court may significantly have changed Illinois
common law based on the Seventh Circuit's inaccurate view. A closer look
at Leopold and other Illinois privacy opinions by the Berkos court may have
inspired a different holding.
Specifically, Leopold embodies not the potentially expansive view of pri-
vacy that the Seventh Circuit found in Douglass, but instead, a cautious
approach to this tort based on extreme deference to the media. Therefore,
the Berkos court should have considered for itself whether Illinois should,
indeed, recognize false light and, if so, the court was obligated to provide
guiding principles for future courts considering the tort.
Furthermore, the Berkos court failed to clarify the standard of proof
applicable to false light. As long as false light remains actionable in Illinois,
courts should uphold the actual malice standard for all plaintiffs bringing
false light cases that involve matters of public interest. In Leopold, the
Illinois Supreme Court suggested that the press' first amendment protections
are so important that they should limit privacy rights in Illinois. The need
that protect public disclosure should provide "absolute protection" of speech in a false light
context. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 964. However, Walden & Netzhammer, citing the Supreme
Court's reluctance to provide absolute protection for knowing or reckless falsehoods (i.e., New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)) observe that Nimmer's suggestion is not practical.
Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 26, at 378-79. Nonetheless, because they support Nimmer's
concern for protecting speech in accordance with the first amendment, they suggest a practical
alternative to Nimmer's "absolute" protection of speech: inasmuch as the newsworthiness
defense applies to public disclosure of private facts. Walden & Netzhammer argue that the
parallel in false light would be to apply the actual malice standard to false statements which,
if true, would be privileged as newsworthy matters of public interest. This would "acknowledge
the Supreme Court's declaration that the Constitution provides no protection for 'calculated
falsehood,"' (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)), while at the same time
provide the press the maximum first amendment protection. Walden & Netzhammer, supra
note 26. at 378-79.
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for these limitations is stronger when those rights concern matters of legit-
imate public interest.
VI. POSTSCRIPT: THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES FALSE LIGHT
INVASION OF PRIVACY
On February 2, 1989, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized false light
invasion of privacy as a cause of action in Lovgren v. Citizens First Natl'
Bank.27 It did so even though the plaintiff, Harold Lovgren, never stated
such a cause of action in his complaint. 22 Instead, his complaint alleged
invasion of privacy based on an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion
of another, " 6 a claim the trial court dismissed. 227 The Appellate Court of
Illinois reversed and remanded, finding that Lovgren had stated a cause of
action for intrusion upon seclusion m The Illinois Supreme Court granted
leave to amend and found that the facts amounted not to an action for
intrusion upon seclusion, but for false light invasion of privacy. 229
224. Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 126 Il. 2d 411 (1989).
225. Id. at 414. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Unlike the appellate court, we do not find that the plaintiff has stated a cause
of action for intrusion into the seclusion of another. We do find, however, that
the facts alleged state a cause of action for that privacy violation referred to as
publicity placing (a] person in false light. Therefore, although we affirm the appellate
court and remand the case, we do not adopt the reasoning of the appellate court
and vacate that part of the appellate court opinion which finds that plaintiff has





228. Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 166 II. App. 3d 582, 520 N.E.2d 91 (3d Dist.
1988).
229. See supra note 225 (citing pertinent part of Illinois Supreme Court's Lovgren opinion).
In ruling that Lovgren had failed to plead a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, the
court noted that, according to the Restatement (Second) § 652B, the "core of this tort is the
offensive prying into the private domain of another." Lovgren, 126 III. 2d at 417. In contrast,
the court concluded that the alleged offensive conduct and subsequent harm in this case resulted
"from the defendants' act of publication, not from an act of prying analogous to the examples
set forth by Prosser and Keeton." Id. Examples cited by the court include: invading someone's
home; an illegal search of someone's shopping bag in a store; eavesdropping by wiretapping;
peering into windows of a private home; and persistent and unwanted telephone calls. Id. (citing
W. PRossER & W. KEETON, supra note 53, § 117, at 854-56). See supra notes 74-78 and
accompanying text (discussing intrusion upon seclusion, where it was noted that significant
difference between this form of invasion of privacy and the other three is that it occurs
unlawfully as soon as intrusion takes place, even if information gleaned is not revealed or
published).
Interestingly, although the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the privacy tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, setting forth its definition as found in the Restatement (Second) and citing
examples offered by Prosser and Keeton, the court noted that its discussion did "not imply a
recognition . . . of such a cause of action." Lovgren, 126 III. 2d at 417. The court further
1160
BERKOS v. NBC, INC.
A. The Illinois Appellate Court's Decision
Lovgren's three counts of intrusion upon seclusion were directed against
Citizens First National Bank of Princeton, James Miller, the bank's vice
president, and William Etheridge, an auctioneer. 0 Lovgren took out a
second mortgage on his farmland in April, 1983, with the bank, signing a
promissory note and executing a trust deed in favor of the bank.Y1 Lovgren
subsequently borrowed more money from the bank and signed additional
promissory notes secured by the trust deed.2 2 Sometime after 1983, Lovgren
failed to meet his financial obligations to the bank and employees of the
bank urged him to sell his farm. Lovgren declined to sell and asked for
more time to meet his debts. 233 However, in early November, 1985, the bank
and auctioneer Etheridge ran advertisements in local newspapers and hand-
bills stating that Lovgren would be selling his farm at public auction on
November 25, 1985.2 4 At that time no such sale had been scheduled, and
the bank had not started mortgage foreclosure proceedings against Lov-
gren. " I When he became aware of the scheduled sale, Lovgren filed suit
against the bank, the bank's vice president, and the auctioneer.
In his intrusion upon seclusion suit, Lovgren alleged that defendants had
caused him anguish and suffering and had made it practically impossible for
him to obtain refinancing of his mortgage loan.2 6 Lovgren's complaint also
sought compensatory and punitive damages and costs.27 Each defendant
moved to dismiss Lovgren's complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted each of their motions. 8
On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed and remanded the trial
court's decision." 9 Citing Melvin v. Burling,240 the appellate court found that
stated:
We note that there is a conflict among the Illinois appellate court districts as to
whether this cause of action should be recognized in this State. (See Melvin v.
Burling (3d Dist. 1986), 141 11). App. 3d 786 (recognizing cause of action); Kelly
v. Franco (1st Dist. 1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 642 (not recognizing cause of action);
Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde (5th Dist. 1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 480 (implicitly
recognizing cause of action); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott (4th Dist. 1976),
36 Ill. App. 3d 1006 (not recognizing cause of action); see also M. POLELLE & B.
OrnEy, ILLiNois ToRT LAw 192-96 (1985) (discussing Illinois Appellate Court's
treatment of unreasonable intrusion on another's seclusion).) We do not find it
necessary, however, to resolve these differences in this case.
Id. at 417-18.
230. Lovgren, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 584, 520 N.E.2d at 92.









240. The requirements for intrusion upon seclusion, as set out in Melvin v. Burling, 141 I1.
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Lovgren had satisfied all four requirements necessary to allege intrusion
upon seclusion. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.2 1
B. Analysis of the Lovgren Opinion
In recognizing Lovgren's cause of action as one for false light invasion of
privacy, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed several issues raised by this
Casenote, settling some of them as suggested herein. First, the Lovgren court
recognized the false light tort. Second, the court avoided deciphering the
Illinois conflict by relying on the Restatement (Second) as support for the
tort's legitimacy. Finally, the Lovgren court adopted an actual malice stan-
dard for all plaintiffs bringing a false light action.
1. Recognition of False Light
This Casenote speculated that the Illinois Supreme Court might not rec-
ognize false light because of the tort's questionable foundation in Illinois
common law,24 2 and because of the court's guarded tone in Leopold when
240. The requirements for intrusion upon seclusion, as set out in Melvin v. Burling, 141 Ill.
App. 3d 786, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1986), are: 1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into
the plaintiff's seclusion; 2) the intrusion was offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man;
3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurred was private; and, 4) the intrusion caused the
plaintiff anguish and suffering. See supra notes 74.78 and accompanying text (discussing
intrusion upon seclusion and Melvin opinion). The appellate court noted that the circuit court
found the first requirement met and did not expand any further. Lovgren, 166 111. App. 3d at
585, 520 N.E.2d at 92-93. As to the second element, the court said that a trier of fact could
find that Miller, the bank's vice president, in advertising Lovgren's land for sale rather than
pursuing acceptable legal remedies, engaged in an activity that a reasonable man would find
objectionable or offensive. Id., 520 N.E.2d at 93. As to the third element, the court found
that a mortgage exists only to secure indebtedness and that against every other person, and for
every other purpose, the mortgagor is the owner of the land and as such is entitled to the
"undisturbed occupation" of it; thus, the decision whether to sell his land was private to
Lovgren and did not concern the public in any manner. id. Finally, the court found that since
defendants' intrusion made it "practically impossible" for Lovgren to obtain refinancing of
his mortgage loan, and since it can also be inferred he had to endure humiliation and
embarrassment in explaining to acquaintances and relatives that he was not selling his land, a
trier of fact could find the intrusion caused anguish and suffering. Id.
241. Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 414. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
We find that this case is here by virtue of an appeal from the allowance of a
motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of
action admits all well-pleaded facts. Additionally, a motion to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a cause of action should not be granted unless it clearly appears
that no set of facts could be proven under the pleadings which would entitle the
plaintiff to relief. . . . Thus, within this framework, we must decide whether the
facts alleged satisfy the elements of a cause of action for publicity placing a person
in a false light.
Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
242. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois Supreme Court's view
of invasion of privacy and competing right of press to publish what it deems matter of public
interest).
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it admonished Illinois courts to "proceed with caution" when expanding
privacy rights.23 However, this Casenote also concluded that it was desirable
to allow plaintiffs to assert false light in those instances in which publication,
while not defamatory, was highly offensive in the nature and extent of the
intrusion. 2" The Illinois Supreme court in Lovgren agreed. The court found
that there were "recognizable differences" between false light and defama-
tion, and that while all defamation cases can possibly be analyzed as false
light cases "not all false-light cases are defamation cases." 24 Furthermore,
the Illinois Supreme Court recognized false light based not on the Douglass
court's view that false light was rooted in the common law of Illinois,246 but
on reasoned analysis. The court provided the following justifications for its
holding: the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Prosser and Keeton long
have recognized that such a tort exists at common law;24 7 other jurisdictions
have embraced the tort of false light as a cause of action;u" and plaintiff
Lovgren satisfied the requirements necessary to allege the tort. 49 Similarly,
this Casenote pointed out that those courts which had proceeded as if false
light existed in Illinois had done so based on the Restatement (Second) rather
than on questionable Illinois precedent. 250 Therefore, this Casenote con-
243. Id. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing Leopold opinion).
244. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (discussing false light and reasons
supporting recognizing false light cause of action in Illinois).
245. Specifically, the court stated the following: "[tlhere is an overlapping of protected
interests in the false-light privacy tort and those protected by defamation law. Yet, there are
recognizable differences. It has been said that all defamation cases can be analyzed as false-
light cases, but not all false-light cases are defamation cases." Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 421
(citing M. POLELLE & B. OTnzY, ILLiNois TORT LAW 199-200 (1985)).
246. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1094 (1986); see supra 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's Douglass
opinion).
247. Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 126 II1. 2d 411, 418 (1989). The court directly
quoted the Restatement (Second's) definition of false light as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
rd. at 418 (citing REsTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 4. at § 652E).
The examples the court cited from Prosser and Keeton include publicity falsely attributing
to the plaintiff some type of opinion or statement, filing suit in the plaintiff's name without
authorization, or using the plaintiff's name on a petition without authorization. Id.
248. Id. at 423 (citing 57 A.L.R. 4th 22, 58-69 (1987) (annot.)).
249. Id. at 420. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (Lovgren court's discussion
of how plaintiff Lovgren satisfied Restatement (Second's) requirements for alleging false light
invasion of privacy).
250. See supra notes 116, 192-94 and accompanying text (Illinois cases that proceeded as if
false light were a part of Illinois common law, and discussion of Restatement (Second's)
influence on Illinois false-light suits).
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cluded, that line of cases did not have its roots in Illinois common law at
all, but in the Restatement (Second's) treatment of false light.2"'
In this vein, the court in Lovgren adopted the elements of false light found
in the Restatement (Second). 12 Applying those elements to the facts in
Lovgren, the court found that defendants' advertising of an auction of
plaintiff's farm satisfied the publicity requirement for false light." 3 The court
found also that the publicity was "clearly untrue" in that it named Lovgren
as seller, thus satisfying the falsity requirement." 4 Moreover, the court found
that "[a] trier of fact could conclude that defendants knew that the publi-
cation of this false fact would prove highly offensive to the plaintiff," 2"
thus satisfying the third element of false light as set out in the Restatement
(Second)."6
2. False Light's Dimensions in Illinois
While the Lovgren court did not acknowledge the conflict among Illinois
appellate courts over whether false light was cognizable in Illinois, it also
did not recognize the Seventh Circuit's strained interpretation of Leopold in
Douglass.2 7 Instead, as noted, the Illinois Supreme Court in Lovgren relied
forthrightly on the definitions and standards found in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and Prosser and Keeton's Law of Torts. 28 Given the
251. Id.
252. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (Restatement (Second) citation).
253. The court stated: "After an examination of the advertisement placed in the local
newspaper, we note that sufficient publicity was generated to satisfy this requirement." Lovgren,
126 Ill. 2d at 419.
254. The court stated: "Further, because the advertisement stated that the farm was for sale
by public auction, and named the plaintiff as seller which was clearly untrue the defendants'
actions placed the plaintiff in a false light before the public." Id. at 419.
255. Id.
256. The court stated:
[W]e must determine whether a finder of fact could decide that the false light in
which the plaintiff was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The test articulated by the Restatement states that this element is met "when the
defendant knows that the plaintiff, as a reasonable man, would be justified in the
eyes of the community in feeling seriously offended and aggrieved by the publicity."
(REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OP ToRTS § 625E [sicl, comment c, at 396 (1977)). We
caution, however, that minor mistakes in reporting, even if made deliberately, or
false facts that offend a hypersensitive individual will not satisfy this element.
Of considerable significance is the allegation that the unauthorized advertisement
made it practically impossible for plaintiff to obtain refinancing of his mortgage
loan. A trier of fact could conclude that the defendants knew that the publication
of this false fact would prove highly offensive to the plaintiff. Thus, we conclude
that the facts alleged state a cause of action based on the tort of publicity placing
another in a false light.
Id. at 419-20.
257. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's decision in
Douglass).
258. See supra notes 229, 247 and 256 and accompanying text (Illinois Supreme Court's
discussion of Restatement (Second's) definitions and standards).
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confusion over false light in Illinois until now, this may be the most
convenient, if not the most graceful approach the Illinois Supreme Court
could have taken to extricate itself from the morass of prior conjecture.
Furthermore, the court in Lovgren was attempting to reconcile its recog-
nition of false light with its 1970 Leopold opinion. 2 9 To this end, the court
conceded that Leopold's primary thrust was to limit, not expand, privacy
rights, even while recognizing them.w However, the Court explained that
because this case, unlike Leopold, involved the private matters of a private
citizen, the first amendment limitations stressed in Leopold were not impli-
cated. 261 Therefore, the court concluded it was appropriate to recognize false
light invasion of privacy, Leopold notwithstanding, because there was "no
need or reason for the uninhibited and robust discussion essential in cases
involving a public interest or a public figure." 2
This language appears to limit false light to private plaintiffs and private
matters, even while recognizing it as a cause of action. This is in keeping
with Leopold's paramount goal of restricting privacy rights whenever they
involve public figures or matters of public interest. 263 The court was careful
to confine its discussion to the case at hand, suggesting that any application
of Lovgren to facts which depart from those at issue in that case may be
inappropriate. 264 In light of the supreme court's language in Lovgren, it
259. The court stressed that it must "consider this tort in light of first amendment limita-
tions." Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 421. The court added:
In Leopold v. Levin, this court recognized a right of privacy and also recognized
that the dimensions of this right in this State had been defined by our appellate
court. Quoting from the appellate court opinion in Bradley v. Cowles Magazines,
Inc., 26 Il1. App. 2d 331, 334, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960), the court stated that "the
purpose underlying the right of privacy action was '[tio find an area within which
the citizen must be left alone' " and that, viewing the possible development of the
right, "[ilt is important .. that in defining the limits of this right, courts proceed
with caution."
Id. at 420-21 (citing Leopold v. Levin, 45 Il. 2d 434, 440, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1970)).
260. The court stated: "Ours is not a case involving a public figure or a matter of public
interest. In Leopold, it was noted that in such cases the right or privacy is a limited one."
Lovgren, 126 I1. 2d at 421 (citing Leopold, 45 I1. 2d at 440, 259 N.E.2d at 254).
261. The Lovgren court noted:
In our case, the interest is purely a private one involving only the plaintiff and his
bank. There was thus no need or reason for the uninhibited and robust discussion
essential in cases involving a public interest or public figure. Acknowledging the
above admonition that in defining the limits of this right courts proceed with
caution, we, nonetheless, recognize that plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for
a violation of his right of privacy.
Id. at 421 (citing Leopold, 45 I1. 2d at 442, 259 N.E.2d at 255).
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 104.08 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois Supreme Court's
discussion of why privacy rights should be restricted whenever they involve public figures or
matters of public interest).
264. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text (citing pertinent portion of Illinois
Supreme Court's Lovgren opinion).
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seems that Judge Berkos, because he is a public official and his claim clearly
involved a public interest, might not have been able to prevail on his false
light claim at all. 26
3. The "Actual Malice" Standard
In keeping with its cautious approach to privacy rights in Leopold, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Lovgren adopted the "actual malice" standard of
the Restatement (Second). 266 This standard suggests that all false light plain-
tiffs, private individuals as well as public officials and public figures, must
prove actual malice. 267 This is precisely the standard this Casenote recom-
mended,261 notwithstanding the belief of some commentators that only a
negligence standard should apply to false light actions that do not concern
matters of public interest.2 6
9
The court in Lovgren discussed the United States Supreme Court's opinions
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,270 Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 2 7'1
and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 272 and concluded that the Supreme Court had left
open the question of whether false-light plaintiffs must prove actual malice.2 7
265. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing why it was likely that Judge
Berkos' false light claim was inappropriate) and notes 259-62 and accompanying text (explaining
Illinois Supreme Court's comparison in Lovgren of -false light claims that involve public figures
and public matters and those that do not, based on Leopold).
266. See supra note 247 (Restatement (Second's) standard for actual malice in false light
allegations).
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text (discussing why Illinois courts should
adopt actual malice requirement for all plaintiffs alleging false light).
This Casenote suggests that Illinois courts should require false-light plaintiffs to prove actual
malice regarding matters of public interest, at the very least. However, it also expresses support
for Illinois courts' requiring the actual malice standard for all plaintiffs alleging false light,
mostly because of the notion, supported by the Restatement (Second), that false light is less
threatening a personal injury than libel and therefore should require a higher threshold of
proof.
269. See supra notes 210 and 222 (commentators' discussion of proper fault standards for
false-light allegations).
270. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
271. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
272. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
273. The court reviewed the actual malice requirement for defamation cases laid down in
Gertz, that "the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publication of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private person as distinguished from a
public figure." Lovgren v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 126 Iil. 2d 411, 421 (1989). The court noted
that the United States Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). had considered
a false-light action regarding a matter of public interest and had required proof of actual malice
by defendants. The Loygren court added that in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419
U.S. 245 (1974), the trial judge had instructed the jury that liability could be imposed only if
the publication was made with actual malice and "[nlo objection had been made to that
instruction." 126 I11. 2d at 422. The court continued:
The Supreme Court stated that under these circumstances, there was no occasion
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Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the actual malice approach
of the Restatement (Second), based on "the admonition of Leopold v. Levin
to proceed with caution" in expanding privacy rights.27 4 Similarly, this
Casenote suggested that the actual malice standard was appropriate for all
false-light plaintiffs because such an approach was in accord with Leopold's
overriding interest in encouraging discussion of public matters,2" and would
strike the fairest balance between the plaintiffs' opportunity to plead false
light and the press' right to publish what it deemed important.2 76
4. Lovgren's Impact in Illinois
The court in Lovgren pointed out that its decision to adopt the Restatement
(Second's) actual malice standard was not based on its belief that such a
standard was constitutionally required. 27 Rather, its adoption of the actual
malice standard for all plaintiffs was based on "the nature of the tort."27
To explain its reasoning, the court quoted a passage from Prosser and
Keeton's Law of Torts, which stresses that the outrageous character of the
publicity "comes about ... by virtue of the fact that some part of the
matter reported was false and deliberately so. '279 This suggests that some
degree of knowledge or lack of diligence is an element inherent in the false
light tort.
Several commentators have criticized this view because it assumes that a
false invasion is offensive and, therefore, "ignores the heart of the wrong. ' '2 90
These commentators suggest, instead, that the fundamental question is whether
the communication is privacy-invading. Once the communication is shown
to be privacy-invading, only then should a court address falsity and offen-
to decide whether the State ... could relax the standard of liability for publication
of false statements in a false-light invasion of privacy case where a private individual
and not a public figure is involved.
Thus the question of whether in false-light cases the plaintiff must allege and
prove "actual malice" has been left open.
Id
274. The court stated: "We conclude, however, in light of the admonition of Leopold v.
Levin to proceed with caution, that in false-light cases it is not necessary to distinguish between
private and public figures, as is required in some defamation cases, and we, accordingly adopt
the 'actual malice' approach of the Restatement." Id. (citing RSsTATEm:ENT (SECOND), supra
note 4, at § 394).
275. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text, and note 268 (discussing why Illinois
should require actual malice standard of proof for all plaintiffs alleging false light).
276. Id.
277. Lovgren, 126 Il1. App. at 422.
278. Id. at 422-23.
279. Id. at 423.
280. See supra note 86 (criticisms of Prosser and Keeton's view of false light). Nimmer also
recognized that privacy-invasion was at the heart of the false-light offense. He wrote: "If the
untrue statements in a false light case are not as to matters which If true would be private,
then the interest in privacy is by hypothesis nonexistent and therefore cannot counterbalance
any opposing interest in free speech." Nimmer, supra note 9, at 935.
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siveness. 8' Under Prosser's interpretation, however, it is difficult to distin-
guish between whether the publication is privacy-invading or whether it is
offensive, precisely because the measure of a publication's invasiveness is
how offensive it is. Under this view, it would be impossible to discern, first,
whether the publication was privacy-invading and then whether it was false
and offensive, because the degree to which the publication invaded plaintiff's
privacy would depend on how offensive it was in its falsity. Underlying the
commentators' criticism of Prosser's view is their opinion that those plaintiffs
alleging false light involving private matters should only have to prove
negligence by the defendant. 2 2
The approach adopted by the Lovgren court goes far to protect the press'
first amendment right to publish what it deems important. The court,
however, recognized the legitimate concerns of plaintiffs whose .privacy is
infringed by offensive false publicity. Furthermore, the court's cautious
approach in Lovgren will protect the press even as to publication of private
matters, in keeping with Leopold's wary attitude toward expanding privacy
rights in Illinois. 23
In this vein, consider if plaintiff Lovgren, instead of suing the bank and
auctioneer, had sued the newspaper that published the false notice of the
auction of his farm. Had the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a negligence
standard for private plaintiffs alleging false light involving private matters,
plaintiff Lovgren would only, have to prove that the newspaper negligently
published the advertisement. This would not directly endanger the press'
first amendment right to publish. A negligence standard, however, would
consume the press' resources by forcing publications to verify even routine
items published, lest they leave themselves open to lawsuits and money
judgments for unintended acts of negligence. When considered from this
perspective, Prosser and Keeton's view of false light, and that of the Illinois
Supreme Court requiring all plaintiffs to prove actual malice, are appro-
priate.3 Moreover, as this Casenote pointed out, to require all plaintiffs
who allege false light to prove actual malice comports not only with Leopold's
cautionary guidance, but also with the notion, supported by the Restatement
(Second) and other commentators, that false light is less threatening a
personal injury than libel and therefore should require a higher threshold of
proof.?5
In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether Illinois courts will confine
recognition of false light actions to publicity of private matters and private
281. Walden & Netzharnmer, supra note 26, at 377.
282. Id. at 378-80.
283. See supra notes 98-108, 137-43, 176-77, 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois
Supreme Court's view of invasion of privacy and competing right of press to publish what it
deems a matter of public interest, and Leopold opinion).
284. See supra notes 224-79 and accompanying text (Lovgren court's explanation of Prosser
and Keeton's view of false light invasion of privacy).
285. See supra note 229 and accompanying text, and note 268 (discussing why Illinois courts
should adopt actual malice requirement for all plaintiffs alleging false light).
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plaintiffs. This course seems plausible in light of the Lovgren Court's
deference to the Leopold opinion and Leopold's strong support of first
amendment freedom for the press. Furthermore, even if Illinois courts are
inclined to recognize false light claims brought by public figures or those
involving public matters, the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of the actual
malice standard for all false-light plaintiffs will make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail on false light claims by requiring them to prove either
that the defendant knew the publication was false, or acted in reckless
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